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B. The North and Political Reaction

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648 Although the West, particularly England, had been pressing the Ch'ing Dynasty from the late eighteenth century for the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations on a basis of equality and fought a war with China in 1840-42 in an attempt to institute such relations, Western military force did not penetrate the North China Region until 1858. Anglo-French armies, accompanied by American and Russian diplomatic representatives, occupied Tientsin in that year as part of a renewed effort to obtain the old objectives. When Peking continued to procrastinate, the French and English forces thrust into Peking in 1860. The Manchu court having fled north to south-western Manchuria, the armies of both nations sacked the Summer Palace in retaliation for mistreatment of some captured Western soldiers. The Ch'ing Dynasty was not only forced to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with the West, but had to do so with China as an inferior partner.

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178 The real power of the Manchu throne from 1856 to 1908 was concentrated in the hands of the Empress Dowager Tz'u Hsi (or the "Old Buddha," as she was commonly called). A strong-willed and capable woman, she was largely ignorant and unmindful of China's

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643 weakness, strongly anti-foreign, resistant to
178 reform, and more intent on seeking satisfaction for her own desires and whims than in promoting the nation's welfare. One example of her tendencies was the diverting of millions of dollars appropriated for the modernization of China's navy into the rebuilding of the Summer Palace at Peking, including, ironically, a marble ship. Surrounded by corruption and grasping, idle courtiers as ignorant and reactionary as herself, Tz'u Hsi was responsible in great part for the failure of such reform and modernization as was attempted while she held power.

178 One of the most reform-minded and influential of the scholar-officials from Hopei who served the Ch'ing Dynasty was Chang Chih-tung (1837-1909). The essence of his ideas was expressed in the slogan he made famous in 1898, summing up the approach to change of the generation that preceded and followed him -- Chung-hsüeh wei t'i, Hsi-hsüeh wei yung ("Chinese study for the fundamental principles, Western learning for practical application"). In word and deed, he promoted industrialization as a means of saving China. On the other hand, in his widely read book, Ch'üan-shueh-p'ien [Exhortation to Study], he stoutly supported the Manchu Dynasty as the defender of the Chinese race, insisted on

178 Confucianism as the basis of the nation, and scorned the adoption of such western institutions as constitutional monarchy, democracy, and personal liberty.

These ideas published in 1898 represented social and political reaction following China's defeat by Japan. More forward leaders from the South were then demanding rapid political and social reform on a grand scale, including the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Under their inspiration, an attempt was made by the young emperor to institute rapid reform in 1898, but within three months the efforts ended in his deposition by Tz'u Hsi. She hounded out of Peking and the country such of his southern ministers as she could not arrest and execute. Chang Chih-tung continued to serve the dynasty while it gave way, too little and too late, to the rising demand for reform and constitutional monarchy.

C. Anti-Foreignism

177 The Westerner encountered violence wherever China was forced to permit him residence in the country, but the worst outbursts of anti-foreignism occurred in Hopei and Shansi. Provincial and local officials in the two provinces were not only within reach and influence of the Manchu court, but were also largely sympathetic to its reactionary

161 completed as early as March 30, 1954. The results show:

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. Total Population of Tientsin | 2,693,831 |
| 2. Children born since 1949 | 366,688 |
| 3. Babies under one year old | 86,968 |

[163] During the year 1953, an average of 240 babies were born daily in Tientsin. According to the Communists, the birth rate of 1953 in Tientsin was 3.2 per cent higher than in 1948.[7]

On the basis of the above-mentioned statistics and the available 1948 population figure of 1,772,840 for Tientsin, we can say that the annual rate of increase in Tientsin's population is approximately 87 per thousand, or 8.7 per cent.[8] This, indeed, is an alarming rate. In view of the following facts it is seen that this rate does not represent the North China Region as a whole: (1) The 1948 population figure of 1,772,840 for Tientsin announced by the Ministry of the Interior at 161 Nanking has never been checked or verified. (2) 166 The sudden jump of Tientsin's population since 178 1948 is at least partially attributable to the influx

[7] Enlightenment Daily, Mar. 30, 1954, p.1.

[8] The 1948 Tientsin figure is taken from Chung-hua Min-kuo T'ung-chi T'i-yao [Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China, 1955], Taipei, Executive Yuan, 1955, p.34. Compulati on of rate of increase is according to Ch'en Ta, Jen-K'ou Wen-t'i [Population], Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1935, p. 116.

[178] 161 166 of people resulting from the intensive industrialization program that has been pushed in this locality. Immigrants have a dual effect on the total population of Tientsin for they augment the total figure and increase the number of births. Considering these statements, it can be concluded that the rapid increase in Tientsin's population is not sufficient reason to assert that the increase rate for this region deviates in any great measure from the over-all trend of national population increase, which is 2 per cent per annum.

165 Lack of information on the death rate in this region makes it impossible to discuss this subject in any detail. However, the Peking regime has cited a few isolated cases as evidence of its claim that the welfare of the people has been greatly improved since the "liberation". One of the cases cited involves the Ch'ang-chih District in Shansi Province, where in 1949 as many as 57 per cent of the babies born in the district died of apoplectic diseases. To prove how health and sanitation measures have improved, Communist sources cited the population of one village -- Hsia-Ch'uan; for over fifty years the total population had remained about 470 until the census of 1953 raised it to 515.[9/] Another case cited concerns the new capital of China, Peking. In November 1950, the death rate in Peking stood at 0.11 per cent. Three years later, after the nation-wide

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9/ Jen-min Shou-ts'e [ People's Handbook], Tientsin, Ta-kung pao, 1955, p. 29.

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## B. Sex Ratio

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The official communique reporting the results of the 1953 census failed to disclose any regional breakdown on the sex ratio of the Chinese population. On this question the latest available information is that which was released by the Ministry of the Interior of the Chinese Nationalist Government in 1948 and which has since been quoted in all official reports.

Table 3. Sex Ratio in North China Population (1948) */
(Number of Males per Hundred Females)

| | |
|---|---|
| Hopei Province | 116.25 |
| Shansi Province | 121.62 |
| Peking Municipality | 125.66 |
| Tientsin Municipality | 133.43 |
| Average | 118.92 |

*/ Statistical Abstract of the Republic of China, 1955.

## C. Rural and Urban Population

162 The traditionally large percentage of rural population in China undoubtedly still holds true to a great extent in the North China Region. However, the effect of industrialization on the basically agricultural nature of this region should be mentioned. Since the North China Region is undergoing intensive industrialization, the urban-rural population ratio may change radically. Although the

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## III. INTERNAL MIGRATION

### A. Migration toward Industrial Centers

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168 Apart from the northwestern province of Shensi, the Chinese Communists have had the best opportunity and the greatest time to develop and reorganize the provinces of North China. With the central Communist authority close at hand, all the details of administrative reorganization have been quickly disposed of and the way to industrialization and economic reconstruction has been rapidly prepared. According to China Mainland sources, recovery of industrial productivity in this region has been rapid, and the Communists have carried out a program of expansion for existing factories and the construction of new factories. The much-publicized five-year plan of Peking determines 156 industrial units for expansion and construction; a good number of them are in this region.[11] The government has been making a systematic effort to facilitate the migration of skilled and unskilled laborers and their families to these centers. Most of the immigrants are from the countryside around the industrial centers; others are from outside of this region.

### B. Migration toward Large-scale Construction Sites

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166 As in the Central-South Region, in North China large-scale construction projects have been launched. The extensive flood-control projects on the Yung-ting River in Hopei Province and the

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[11] People's Handbook, 1955,

178 166 Kuan-t'ing Reservoir on the same river, which is reported to have been completed, have caused sizable concentrations of population at the sites of these projects. Hundreds of thousands of people are employed upon a mammoth construction program in Peking, which, when completed, will expand the city to seven times its original size. Some of these migrant workers have settled permanently in the city. This situation has led authorities in Peking to predict that Peking's population will increase to over four million at the end of the expansion program. 12/

C. Emigration from this Region to the Northeast

Mass emigration from south of the Great Wall to the northeast dates from the early 1920's. The majority of the emigrants started their journey from Hopei Province in this region and from Shantung Province in East China. Early statistics have placed the total number of Hopei and Shantung emigrants to the northeast at over five million during 1923-30. Many have adopted the northeast as their home. Between 1927 and 1930 about 1,500,000 people had permanently settled in the northeast. 13/

168 The Peking regime encourages this emigration. Large groups of men skilled in technical work have been sent where they are needed. Experienced

12/ Wang Tzu-ch'iang, Pei-ching [Peking], Shanghai, Hua-tung jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1954, p. 55.

13/ Hua-pei Wu-sheng Hsin Ti-t'u [New Map of the Five Provinces of North China], Shanghai, Ya-kuang yü-ti hsüeh-she, 1950.

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laborers who returned to North China but who could not find enough work in the factories there, are now employed in the less populated provinces of Manchuria. At the same time, people have been encouraged to settle on reclaimed lands. These population movements are continuing in this region.

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the support of politicians, warlords as well as capitalists. Even the Kuomintang leaders had to come to terms with the society in their campaign against the warlords, and the Japanese occupation forces during 1937-1945 utilized Ch'ing-pang organizations to rout Communist underground agents.[8]

## II. DISRUPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Just as the scholar ideal and the family ideal helped to preserve the stability of the total social order of China, the disintegration of the traditional family system and the abolition of the imperial examination system for recruiting the ruling elite became contributing factors to the dislocation of the traditional social structure.

There was no change in the social composition of the rural population in the past several decades. As of old, the village community consisted of farm laborers at the bottom and landlords at the top. Peasant landowners and tenants constituted the bulk of the village population; and village peddlers, merchants, and artisans were members of peasant families, most of which owned land; the village gentry, that is to say the local leaders were mostly retired officials or educated members of landlords' or rich peasants' families.[9]

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8. Ibid., pp. 64-65.

9. Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946, p. 68.

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However, the growth of rural population, without a comparable increase in arable land, together with more opportunities for employment in the cities caused the migration of some peasants to the urban centers. The continued high premium placed on learning, practical or otherwise, induced the wealthier rural inhabitants to send their children to modern city schools which offered new opportunities. Thus, the cities became the centers from which the forces of change radiated into the surrounding countryside.

Some of the rural immigrants became permanent residents in the cities; others returned to their home villages. Among the permanent residents, some left their families in the country while others brought their immediate families (wives and children) to the cities. In either case, it meant the breakup of family and clan relations. Industrial work and other city employment changed the outlook of these rural people; new professions such as modern medicine, law, engineering, and banking attracted the attention of those who would otherwise have been occupied in the study of the Confucian Classics. This was especially true after Confucian training had been found "impractical" and not in keeping with the changing conditions. Education in the secondary schools and colleges, however inadequate and artificial it might seem, was

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369 designed for better citizenship.[10] Their curri
178 cula opened a new and different world, far more
565 interesting and intelligible to the younger generation than the classics of old. If modern education had not always succeeded in giving new skills to the students, it at least had taught them not to be satisfied with their lot, but to look to the future rather than to the past for betterment. With the increase of schools, there emerged in the cities a considerable professional class and a large number of students cut off for years
369 from their original environment. Students and
178 intellectuals, seeking some common meeting
565 ground, banded together, and with their newly-
517 found organizations came a semblance of separate class consciousness. Although many students depended for their subsistence on their families they had nothing to do with the cultivation or management of land. Alienated from the land and anxious to find a new channel of social advancement, the intellectuals were confronted with the problems of social disorder. Furthermore, in contrast to the situation in Europe during a comparable cultural period, when the landed aristocracy contested with the merchants, industrialists, and bankers for positions

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10. Hu Shih, The Chinese Renaissance, the Haskell Lectures, University of Chicago, 1933, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1934; Teng and Fairbank, op. cit.

369 in the ruling elite, political power and economic
178 power in modern China continued to be in the
565 hands of a single group. When social mobility
519 was made difficult by the lack of a clear and recognized channel for upward social movement, social roles were less clearly defined; the sons of high government officials became industrialists, bankers' sons became diplomats, and all owned land. Intermarriages between the new and the old upper-class elements were taken for granted. Modern intellectuals, mostly from middle-class families, were unable to obtain position and status in the new business or political hierarchy and yet were unwilling to return to their home villages. They had been too long removed from their original environment to feel anything but estranged from it.

Influenced by the idea of democracy which they had discovered in school, the intellectuals began to solicit support from the masses, a move which traditional scholars would not have considered. Robert North's study of the revolutionary Kuomintang and Communist leaders shows that the majority came from the middle-class, landowning, and merchant families, and attended modern schools.[11] The labor unions, the peasant associations, the rural reconstruction experiments, and the Communist Party became the milieu in which the intellectual began their new careers.

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11. Robert North, Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Elites, Stanford University Press, 1952, pp. 116-121.

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565 During this period of social and political
701 disorder, military men began to gain power,
517 obtaining offices by virtue of their military
178 success. Rather than despising the military as the older scholars did, many intellectuals began to seek similar careers as a means to power. This tendency began with the opening of the Huang-p'u (Whampoa) Military Academy in Kwangtung for the training of officers for the 1923-27 campaign against the warlords. In the war against Japan the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced. A military career has now become a major attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their popular success to their military skill, suggest the prestige granted military men in the modern period.

## III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

565 The Chinese Communists interpret the exist-
668 ing social structure from a Marxist viewpoint, and extoll the ideal of a classless society. Their belief that the transition to a classless society is inevitable justifies the liquidation of certain surviving classes.

### A. Class Differentiation among the Chinese Population

In his book On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949) Mao Tse-tung divided Chinese

565 668 munist-sponsored organizations where membership cuts across class lines. The New Democratic Youth Corps, the Federation of Democratic Youth, the Young Pioneers, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, the labor unions, and the study circles at schools and in factories help to disseminate Communist ideology.

555 668 Participation in these mass organizations, whether voluntary or compulsory, serves to separate the individual from his family, absorbing his time and energy outside the family circle. Enforcement of the Marriage Law, principally through the promotion and supervision of the Federation of Democratic Women, encourages women to leave the confines of the family. The recruitment of candidates for institutions of high learning and the assignment of jobs to graduates when they have completed their education also serve to uproot the individual from his immediate environment and make him dependent for advancement on the Communist regime. The weakening of family loyalty forces the individual to look toward the mass organizations sponsored by the Communists, who regard the Party itself as a desirable substitute for the traditional social structure. Since the individual relies on mass organizations for political advancement, which is the prerequisite for economic and social betterment, the mass organizations are most important for the stabilization of society under the current regime. The regime exercises the power to control the career expectancies of the members of mass organizations, reward the achievement

555 178 668

of those who work for the goals of the Party leadership, and punish with ostracism or more severe penalties those who rebel against the order. For the first time since the abolition of the imperial examination system, a main channel of social advancement has emerged. The mastery of an officially approved body of doctrine is the quickest road to social advancement. The Communist channel of social advancement leads to the selection of conformists. This state of affairs resembles, to some extent, that which prevailed in monarchical times when the mastery of dogmas contained in the classics and their commentaries was the prerequisite to success in the imperial examinations.

The Communist regime has found it necessary to promote as replacements for the old ruling group Communist-reformed and Communist-trained administrative, technical, and [illegible] personnel. Compared with the traditional social mobility, the new social mobility under the Communist regime does not spring from ideals embodied in Chinese culture but from expedient manipulation by the Communist Party.

In the development of industry, waterway and irrigation projects, the settlement of the Northwest, and the nationalization and collectivization of many enterprises may conceivably absorb a good portion of the ambitious younger generation. If social mobility continues to depend on Party loyalty, purges may be used to secure loyalty, to

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555 provide a flow of scapegoats for the grievances
198 which accumulate under a totalitarian system,
668 and to furnish opportunities for advancement for the coming generation, whose continued devotion to the regime is crucial to its survival. But to date in the North China Region the purge of local cadres and officials at the regional level has been mainly limited to the elimination of "old social elements" rather than to the "revolutionaries" themselves.[12]

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12. Consult the chapter on Political Dynamics in this handbook.

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596 also functioned to provide security in old age, food or material help to the poor, and employment for needy or deserving relatives when possible. That a son should not provide for his parents in their old age was unthinkable. Were the sons dead or in some other way unable to assist their parents, the aged were cared for by other close relatives or by the clan. Deeply sanctioned by kinship morality and firmly rooted in Chinese government and business, nepotism was one of the most resistant factors to the advance of the modern political, industrial, and business system in the twentieth century.

## III. THE CHANGING FAMILY

### A. Influence of Modern Technology

178 596 The transition which occurred in the traditional Chinese family from approximately 1842 to the advent of the Communist regime is traceable to three major influences: (1) modern technology with its attendant factory system and modern business organization; (2) the new environment consisting of rapid transportation, modern government education, rural education organizations, and modern books and periodicals; and (3) the revolutionary political and social ferment which followed in the wake of the Western penetration of China. Change came first and most penetratingly in the ports, which were initially influenced by Western trade and later by the growth of native industry centered on these

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cities. The same influence also reached into the rural environs of the city ports in the decades before World War II. The great mass of the Chinese people -- the population of the traditional villages, towns and cities in the interior -- felt the modern impact only in minor ways, if at all.

The first influence of modern technology in China came in the form of an influx of manufactured goods. Their availability at cheap prices changed the consumption and production habits of the family. Articles formerly made at home were bought with cash, necessitating new types of spare-time or full-time occupation removed from the family sphere.

Much more important in effecting a change in the old family pattern was the introduction of modern factory and business methods into China. For one thing, it organized economic activity on a non-family basis. Persons from rural areas attracted to the city by the opportunity to earn an independent income or the necessary supplement to the family's farm income were forced to make their homes near their jobs for at least a part of the year. Either permanently or temporarily they were removed from direct family control and subjected to the new ideas associated with industrial society everywhere.

Another consequence of the factory and business system was a new criteria for employment. The efficient operation of modern produc

tion and management required that personnel be hired on the basis of the possession of such skills as a particular job demanded rather than on the old basis of personal or in relationship to the owner or responsible management. The solidarity of blood relationship and the old employment function of kinship were prime resistants to the spread of modern business enterprises in China, but where the latter succeeded in establishing itself, it forced a fundamental break in the old Chinese familial process.

B. Influence of Modern Environment

In many places where the Chinese population was sheltered from direct contact with modern industrial life, an indirect influence was exerted by the environment. The modern curriculum taught in foreign missionary schools in the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries was approximated by the new government schools and offered to a broader segment of the population in the decade before World War II. New social, political, and economic ideas thus disseminated were supplemented by the outpourings of the press. Some rural villages formerly a day's journey or more away from the nearest great city were brought only hours away by modern methods of transportation, particularly the railroad and the steamship. All these media brought the people and especially the young into contact with ideas and ways of life alien to their own. Awareness of new opportunities, comforts, and pleasures to be had in the modern city planted

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178 a seed of dissatisfaction with the old manner of
5% living.

C. Influence of Revolutionary Thought

An even more disturbing influence on the old way of life was the increasing spread of revolutionary social and political doctrines after 1916. The monarchical reformer K'ang Yu-wei had brought the traditional family under attack as early as 1898 by castigating the "virtues" associated with it as either non-existent or harmful to society. These ideas did not achieve any widespread currency in China until the rise of the New Culture Movement in 1916, a revolution in Chinese thought and expression. It emphasized individualism, the equality of the sexes, and the duty of service and loyalty to the nation. Ideas of this sort were spread by the May Fourth Movement of 1919, in the revolutionary propaganda of the Kuomintang during its struggle for power in the mid-twenties, by the student anti-Japanese agitation of the thirties, and in the socially conscious writings of China's new and popular authors.

D. Effects on Family Nature and Structure

In the relatively small area where these influences were felt, traditional family organization and the roles and functions dependent on it were forced to give way. With a part of the family temporarily or permanently in the city, the authority of the traditional family head was

178 undermined. He was still needed at home to
596 carry on the farm work, and so it was generally the daughters, the sons not needed for agriculture, and occasionally, the wives who entered the cities to seek part-time or full-time work. They sent home from the cities whatever part of their wages that could be spared from their own living needs. The family head thus controlled only their excess earnings and not their full income. He no longer directed the production of the family as a unit nor determined wholly every member's share in consumption. For at least part of the year, he could exert no direct control over the city-dwelling members of the family. With the possibility of an independent livelihood in the city, adult family members in nearby villages had an alternative to harsh treatment by the family head. This factor tended to have a moderating influence on paternalistic authoritarianism.

The family in the rural areas adjacent to industrialized cities was also affected in other ways. Men of advanced years, particularly if they had a classical education or held official position, continued to be honored. However, their position of influence and authority was challenged by younger men with the personal qualities of dynamic leadership and success. Ancestor worship continued to give a greater primacy to males in the family, but the ability of daughters to earn a wage enhanced their value to the family and made their early marriage into another family less desirable. It should be noted,

178 however, that women of farming and laboring
546 families worked outside of the home only out of sheer economic necessity. Neither sex approved of female employment in the factory. Whenever possible, it was avoided or terminated. Among upper-class families, women with modern education began gradually to seek employment in the professions and to regard such work as a means of establishing permanent personal and economic independence.

The independent family in the modern city was most subject to change. Though the influence of the past remained strong, the city families tended toward the nuclear, democratic form. Thus, the old criteria of status based on sex, age, and generation were undermined. This tendency was strongest among the new clerical, managerial, and professional groups in the city. They came mostly from the old well-to-do merchant and gentry class which could afford modern education, sometimes abroad, for their children. Having a higher education, the younger members of this group were far more influenced than were the less literate lower class youth by such modern Western ideas as the right of individual happiness, the equality of the sexes, and the duty of the citizen to give his first loyalty to the interests of the nation.

While modern education gave youth increased stature in the eyes of the family elders, it also served to decrease youth's respect for parents. Olga Lang's 1936 survey of youthful attitudes toward parents disclosed that while only 20 per cent of the boys and 16 per cent of the girls in

178 high school were willing to answer the question
596 as to whether they ever disapproved of their parents' behavior, 58 per cent of the men and 62 per cent of the women in college were willing to answer, and their answers were overwhelmingly critical. The greatest objects of censure were the father, his political views, and his personal habits. He was criticized as "conservative," "feudal," acting "against the trend of the time;" and "immoral," "corrupt," "lazy," "egotistic," "too cautious"; and for gambling, smoking opium, and frequenting brothels. Mothers were more gently and less often criticized, but were reproached for "political backwardness," "unhygienic habits," "gossiping, playing mahjong, guarrelling [and] ill treatment of young daughters-in-law." College students also reported more actual disagreements with parents than did high school students. The most frequent subjects of disagreement were marriage, politics, education, participation in the students' movement, recreation, modern hygiene, and fashions, friends, and future professions.[6]

## E. Effect on Family Economic Role

The decreasing ability of the family to function as a production and consumption unit or as an employment agency in an industrial society has already been pointed out. The initial break with the old form of employment was forced by

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6. Lang, op. cit., pp. 284-87.

178 foreign firms or government services headed by
596 foreigners. Their prohibition against officers hiring or recommending relatives was only beginning to be copied by wholly Chinese institutions such as banks, factories, and schools in the years before World War II. Where the employment of relatives was forbidden, friendship, a common birthplace, training in the same school, or membership in the same secret society often provided the basis for a personal link between an employer and a prospective employee and for the rise of cliques in business and government offices.

Scattered surveys of various strata of the population in industrial areas indicate that only at the upper managerial or owner level, where the facts of economic operation were most pressing, was the majority in favor of impersonal, rational selection of employees. Even in modern colleges, only about half the students appeared to favor that choice. With each successively lower economic level, the preference was more overwhelmingly for selection on the basis of kinship.[7]

F. Effect on Social and Political Role

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With the collapse of the imperial system in 1912, the family was no longer fitted to serve

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7. Ibid., pp. 186-89.

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839 642 •178 596 as the social and political training ground of China. The political parties and modern schools, particularly the colleges and universities, now began to train youth for the new political world which was coming into being after 1911. No comparable institutions existed to inculcate in youth a moral and ethical code that would serve as a common guide in the new society. Attempts by the Kuomintang leaders during the period of the National Government to restore filial piety along with a revised Confucian code to the service of an increasingly authoritarian-minded state met with failure among the nation's youth.[8]

## IV. THE FAMILY UNDER COMMUNISM

### A. The Marriage Law

596 671 In reconstructing Chinese society, the Communist regime has undertaken to change the nature and function of the family. The first step in this direction was the new Marriage Law promulgated in May 1950. It is one of the three legal pillars of the state. The other two -- the Labor Union Law and the Land Reform Law -- were announced at a later date but put into effect within a much shorter time and with greater success.

8. Mary C. Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration: The Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology," Far Eastern Quarterly, August, 1955, pp. 515-32.

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596 668 891 they have inherited from the old regime, but "should be patiently persuaded to see the light."[39]

## V. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NORTH CHINA REGION

### A. Diverse Influences on Family Life

178 596 Several conflicting influences on family organization and function have been present in the North China Region during the last twenty-five years. Until the Japanese invasion of China in 1937, the disruptive forces of industrialization and revolutionary ideas on ancient family patterns were less prevalent in the North China Region than in the Central-South and East China regions. Tientsin was the only city in the North China Region where industrialization had made any appreciable headway, and warlord rule in the region had precluded any wide dissemination of new social and political ideas. Olga Lang's study of family trends in China just before the outbreak of the war showed that within comparable socio-economic groups modern tendencies were less apparent in unindustrialized Peiping than in industrialized Tientsin, but that in neither city were modern trends as prevalent as in Shanghai.[40] Sydney Gamble's prewar investigation of the rural area of Ting hsien in Hopei indicated that some modern

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39. Ibid., 973, pp. 30-32.
40. Lang, op. cit., pp. 120-327.

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178 in.luences were creeping in to affect family life,
596 but that on the whole, it had not departed appre-
cia! y from the traditional mould.[41]

During the war, the cities of Hopei and Shansi and the villages of the provinces along communication routes were occupied by the Japanese and subjected to an influence opposed to that exerted in much of the surrounding countryside where Communist guerrilla armies and political agents were active. To counteract Western and Communist ideas and to make the con ered people of North China mo e amenable to Japanese rule, the occupation regime promoted a revival of Confuciansim and a return to the traditional ways of living. The authority of the male head of the family was re-emphasized; equality between the sexes was criticized and ridiculed; and Western industrialization was scorned as the creator of cities with their att ent evils and was to be replaced by Japanese industrialization to bring machines to the village and preserve the small community patterns of social organization. Japanese terroristic methods of control and persecution of the modern intellectual and professional groups in North China undoubtedly counteracted any influence the Japanese might have been able to exert in effecting a return to the past. However, the Japanese program did pr vent the further intru-

41. Sydney D. Gamble, Ting Hsien, A North China Rural Community, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1954.

sion of modernizing forces in the North China Region and helped to preserve the traditional form and function of the Chinese family so little influenced by modern trends.[42]

Communist dominance in unoccupied rural areas of Shansi and Hopei during the war introduced the village population to new social ideas as well as to new political theory. Women's and young people's organizations were established to enlist the efforts of these groups in the war effort and local defense units. As far as possible, the Communists attempted to introduce such concepts as the equality of the sexes, marriage by free choice, and the right of divorce that were latter to become elements of the New Marriage Law. Always a minority in the rural areas of Shansi and Hopei, the Communnists had to rely on democratic symbols and persuasive techniques rather than force to promote the new social attitudes. At the more securely held bases established in the border areas of Shansi-Chahar-Hopei, Shansi-Suiyuan, Hopei-Jehol-Liaoning, Hopei-Shantung-Honan, and Shansi-Hopei-Honan, the Communists had somewhat greater influence and control than in the villages occasionally visited [illegible] the dominance of roving guerilla bands. After the war, these war bases were redesignated as "liberated areas," and intensive efforts were made to inculcate the people with Communist social and

42. George E. Taylor, The Struggle for North China, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940.

political philosophy of the "New Democracy." The "old liberated areas" are now referred to as "advanced areas" and publicized as models in the Communist effort to reorient the Chinese family and society.

B. The Pace of Reform

In the pace of family reform, the North China Region is probably the most advanced of any territory under the Communist regime. Although industrialization and modern city life with their influences for change in family form and function have a longer history in the East and Northeast China regions, neither region has been subject to as long a period of Communist influence as the North China Region. Furthermore, the region has been under the direct control and surveillance of the central government and is the testing ground for new Communist policies before they are revised and enforced elsewhere in the country.

If and as the new regime fulfills its plans for industrialization and the organization of rural areas in co-operatives or collectives, more insistent pressures than mere propaganda will be brought to bear on the traditional family. But even this kind of force will not completely wipe out the old attitudes and loyalties of the elder generation. No such drawbacks characterize the heavily indoctrinated youth of today, more enthusiastic than their parents for the new order, but the urge manifested by many emancipated young

1:Stanford U. S-4, 5 1956 AF12 North China AF12

people toward individualism and romanticism in love and marriage may pose a problem of equal calibre for the new masters of China.

5// hundred years as factory-made goods destroyed village handicrafts, usury and tenancy increased, wars and ineffectual governments brought disruption and oppression, and overpopulation became steadily worse. "The most bankrupt countryside in Asia is the Chinese. The worst crisis of overpopulation China has yet had to face has been accompanied by a breakdown of traditional ideas and traditional authority so complete as to lead to a state of near anarchy."[2]

182 178 621 The characteristic way of life of the peasants has been slowly disintergrating under manifold pressures. During prosperous periods in the past a delicate balance of human and economic factors fostered a crowded, conformist, but on the whole harmonious village life. Recent decades have seen the old harmony replaced by tension and a predatory struggle for survival. And, despite the isolation of most villages, ideas and ideals from the West have slowly undermined the authority of the older mores and customary laws.

Despite all the fissures that have developed, it is well to remember that peasant life everywhere has a tremendous inertia, that it is incredibly resistant to all the forces of change. Thus much of the sweeping change that occurred in city life under comparable pressures did not occur in the peasant villages.

000 The main economic and social unit of the village is the family, and a special study is de-

2. Maurice Zinkin, Asia and the West, London, 1951, p.111.

178 668 The cadre carried on the continuing effort to destroy traditional mores, which are prime resistants in what the Communists call the long and difficult process of ideological and social reform. He publicizes the new marriage law, discourages or prevents arranged marriages, lectures on sanitation, and sometimes with the help of radio, films, and mobile theatrical units, dramatizes the issues of the day, the need for the farmer to sacrifice, to send his sons to the army, to contribute labor to community projects, to inform on his neighbors, to buy bonds, and so forth. The cadre establishes "winter schools" in which the peasants are given intensive political indoctrination, practical training, and instruction in reading and writing. Hunan reported that 2,500,000 peasants were enrolled in these schools in the winter of 1955.[17]

The age-old drive of the vigorous peasant to increase his family's land holdings is checked by fear lest he be re-classified as a "rich peasant" and be subject to higher taxes and other pressures. Yet what the Communists deplore as the peasant's "spontaneous capitalistic tendency," has not been crushed, and the land-holdings of the more enterprising grow in size.[18]

The effort to force various forms of co-operative work has not been completely successful:

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17. People's Daily, Jan. 30, 1955; SCMP 984, pp. 30-31.

18. Rostow, op. cit., p. 152, cites Peking People's Daily, Feb. 13, 1954.

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"...when a serious team-use of labor, tools, and farm animals was attempted, a variety of unsatisfactory results emerged; quarrels among the families interfered with efficient output; no one assumed responsibility for the upkeep of communal property; the claims of inefficient members violated the sense of equity of the more efficient..." [19]

Yet the villagers' way of life has been greatly altered by the intervention of the government, through the cadres, in all social, economic, and political activities. The pressure to conform, at least outwardly, is formidable. Self-chosen leisure-time activities are few, meetings occupy a great deal of time, and attendance at harangues by Party cadres, entertainment furnished by traveling theatrical groups (all with their ideological message) take more of his liesure. The slack winter season may now findhim in winter school or involved in a community work project directed by the local cadre.

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Settlement of accounts before the New Year holiday now means payment of taxes and the sale to the government of most of the balance of the farmer's grain, for which he receives coupons. The cadres carry this out at village level.[20] The New Year festival itself is

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19. Rostow, op. cit., p. 84.
20. SCMP 979, Feb. 2, 1955, p. 30.

characterized by some traditional activities, modified to promote government aims, and by some new features. The peasant may buy New Year's pictures to decorate his house, but they will probably be romanticized portraits of Mao and other Communist heroes rather than the colorful deities of former days.[21] He may decorate his gate with paired mottoes, but the mottoes will no longer carry the old wishes for long life, happiness, and wealth, but exhortations to conform to Communist standards.[22] The government may allow some additional food for the season, but gambling is forbidden, and social life has been so thoroughly organized that it can no longer be restricted to family and friends. The peasants have been urged to organize their own dramatic troupes to play the approved repertoire, now brought to the villages by traveling troupes. Special mobile teams trained to deliver organized "cultural lectures"; or to show films dramatizing the new order have been moving steadily through the Chinese countryside. The old exchange of visits to relatives in nearby towns now has its Communist counterpart: interchange of visits between urban and rural workers' groups to observe one another's "progress in Communist reconstruction."[23]

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21. Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.

22. Cf. the collection of mottoes in Hua-nan T'ung-shu [South China Almanac], Canton 1953, p. 32.

23. Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2

668 The seasonal pilgrimage, in company,
527 to some famous shrine also has it Communist
198 counterpart: mass pilgrimages to Mao Tse-tung's native village, which is being publicized as a national shrine.[24] Despite its frontal attack on the old familism, the Communist government last year provided special trains to take city dwellers back to their native villages for the holiday; a mass exodus was reported from Peking.[25]

Ch'ing-ming is no longer an approved festival, presumably because of its function as a celebration of kinship ties and family continuity. The next approved traditional holiday is the Dragon Boat festival in June. The boat races have been revived, and the poet Ch'ü Yüan, now a "people's hero, martyred in protest against a corrupt feudal regime," is the focus of celebrations.[26] The moon festival in autumn is also celebrated with extra food allowances and "cultural" activities. The various anniversaries of the Chinese Communists and of the world Communist movement probably do not break into the agricultural working year, but may be the occasion for special propaganda arranged by the local cadre. It will be seen
178 668 that the pattern of living in the villages has been drastically altered; what remains of the old pattern consists of elements too deeply ingrained

24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.; also, SCMP, 972, 1954, p. 21.
26. SCMP, 1075, June 23, 1955, p. 25.

178 668 to be abruptly altered without precipitating a crisis, useful to the Communists in the interest of morale, or adaptable in the promotion of their rural program of change and indoctrination.

## III. CHANGING PATTERNS OF LIVING

668 In the towns and cities, as in the countryside, the greatest changes in living patterns have been brought about by the network of new associations by which the regime envelops and controls the individual. Workers in various traditional crafts, merchants, industrial workers, all are organized by the Party, and it is within these groups, under the guidance of cadres, that the urban working population is most strenuously indoctrinated. In long and frequent meetings, the city dweller is under intense pressure to manifest "correct attitudes," to show himself free of all "feudal" and "bourgeois" taint, and to demonstrate his complete commitment to Communist goals. Through these and other channels he is under continual pressure to step up his efficiency and productivity. The meetings take such a toll of his energy at the end of the working day that they are openly referred to as "fatigue meetings."[27]

City and town dwellers are also organized into street and ward units, which serve further to mold urban life into the new pattern. The townsman, more than the peasant, is open to

27. Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.
28. Cf., "Regulations of Urban Organizations," Current Background, 310, Jan. 17,1955.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 1k,
Sociological Background

# RELIGION

## I. INTRODUCTION

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Religious organization and activity in China has always been strictly limited by what the state felt to be desirable. Public and private morality were not based on any religion but on a combination of philosophic principles (Confucianism) and secular mores. (On this principle, Confucianism is treated in the chapters on Social Values and Patterns of Living.) Governmental authority judged whether a certain religion was conducive to morality and the welfare of the state and then allowed the religion and its adherents a carefully defined range and sphere of activity. Anything beyond that range was regarded as subversive of public welfare and morality, and the religion was curbed or suppressed. As a consequence China has not had, until very recently, any "churches," that is well-organized, centrally disciplined organizations of believers capable of decisively influencing public morality or state policy.

With the slow collapse of the traditional order the effectiveness of government control of religion diminished. The Western powers, as they gained more and more rights and concessions from a weakening China, demanded and

771 got "rights" of religious and missionary activity
•178 which no strong Chinese government would ever have granted. But the rise of nationalist sentiment brought with it hatred of foreigners and of their religions -- hatred that exploded repeatedly in anti-foreign, anti-Christian riots.[1]

Meanwhile another trend was visible. Religious groups and a number of outstanding political leaders began to feel that China could not become truly modern and Western unless it was reformed from the moral base upward; religion accounted for the power and success of Western nations. Would not a religion -- a religionized Confucianism, a revitalized Buddhism, or even Christianity -- bring about that basic transformation that China clearly needed?

This view was rejected by two overlapping groups which had decisive power in state and society after 1925. The first were the intellectual leaders, increasingly committed to some form of materialistic philosophy -- a philosophy which held all religion to be parasitic, corrosive and "non-progressive."[2] The second group was the Kuomintang elite, many of whom derived their anti-religious views from the intellectual leadership. For others in the Kuomintang elite the

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1. Tatsuro and Sumiko Yamamoto, "The Anti-Christian Movement in China," Far Eastern Quarterly, Feb. 1953, pp. 133-47.

2. O. Brière, "Les courants philosophiques en Chine depuis 50 ans," Bulletin de l'université de l'Aurore, No. 40, 1947, pp. 561-654.

older Confucian view of religions, reinforced by nationalist feeling, reasserted itself; consciously or unconsciously they reverted to the view that no strong self-respecting government should tolerate independent religious bodies that challenged the government's right to control all aspects of public and private life.

Religions in the twentieth century were caught in this crossfire of negative sentiment and attack. To modernize and to become militant was to provoke state suppression, and the effort of religious leaders to stem the rising tide of intellectual materialism failed.[3] In the countryside the old folk religions -- varieties of Buddhism and Taoism -- continued to wither away. Christianity made some advances, but it was always tainted by its foreignness, by the fact that its missionaries came with the backing of Western powers which held China in thrall.

Communist policy towards religion is in many ways the culmination of the trends we have described. It reflects the trimph of materialist philosophy and the imposition of materialism as the intellectual orthodoxy. It is highly nationalistic and anti-foreign and thus insists that all religious organizations cease receiving support from abroad and assert their distinctive Chinese character. It carries forward, through the most effective apparatus of control and coercion that China has seen, the confiscation of church property

3. O. Brière, op. cit., passim.

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633 number of other bureaus for public construction work and public utilities. A bureau for minority nationalities and another for overseas Chinese affairs can be added if necessary.

633 178 There is no doubt that Peking since 1949 has been modernized. There are new roads, better systems for drainage and communications, and new housing facilities. A report at the opening session of the first municipal congress by P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking, indicates the areas where the local government has been most active in improving the municipality. P'eng Chen gave the value of industrial products produced in 1954 as being 6.76 times that of 1949, the value of commercial transactions in 1953 as being 4.33 times that of 1949, and the value of agricultural products produced in Peking and its suburbs in 1953 as being 1.21 times that of 1950. New housing developments were reported to have added 6,700,000 square meters (72,092,000 sq. ft.) of living space to the city, an area equal to the total housing previously available in Peking.

633 185 In his report on the work of the municipality of Peking, P'eng Chen said that emphasis was to be placed upon the elimination of traditional evils -- corruption, theft, and so forth; preparations for the "liberation of Formosa; socialistic transformation

information, it appears that relatively little effort has been made in the last few years to establish new facilities. In fact, a considerable portion of the available plants remained idle for some time during the first few years of the Communist regime as a result of marketing difficulties. Some of the mills have been turning out flour from coarse grains instead of wheat flour. However, as the urban population increases, the demand for flour from modern mills will undoubtedly grow.

## V. CONCLUSION

The above review serves to point out that North China is being intensively developed industrially on the basis of the region's resources of coal, iron, salt, and cotton and on the industrial base established by pre-Communist government and private enterprises. This development, owing much to the Communists' political motivation, has apparently been ruthlessly pursued. However, as far as the heavy industries are concerned, neither regional self-sufficiency nor a high level of output in the absolute sense are in sight. This is true especially in the case of the metallurgical and machinery industries.

Whatever industrial developments the Communists have been able to carry out have taken place under strict government control and within the general framework of national planning. There is, of course, no separate planning system for

471 433 178 the North China region as such. As for the gradual process of socialization, its application in North China is discussed in the following chapter.

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 / AF12 North China AF12



*Birth and Death Rates*

A study made by the health department of the Mass Education Association found the crude birth rate to be 40.1 per 1,000, the crude death rate 27.2 per 1,000. The infant mortality was 199 per 1,000 live births, the maternal death rate 13.0 per 1,000 live births.

These figures verify the general report that the population was gradually increasing. The only figures we were able to secure that would give any indication of population growth over a period of years were from the elders of one village. They said that the number of families had increased steadily from 155 in 1882 to 180 in 1932, a growth of 16 per cent in 50 years. (See Chapter XV.) The increase, of course, could be the result of division of families rather than an increase in the number of persons, but the steady growth in the number of families seems to indicate at least some growth in population.

A health study of the students in 25 village primary schools[1] showed that 58.5 per cent of the children had trachoma and 26.2 per cent ringworm.

*Foot-binding*

Foot-binding was almost universal among the women over 40 years of age in the 515 families (99.2 per cent). None of the girls under 13 years of age had bound feet. The figures for the intervening five year age groups show how a cultural pattern, which in the past had successfully defied an imperial ban, had disappeared within 30 years.

The origin of the Chinese custom of foot-binding is uncertain, but apparently it began about one thousand years ago. It is first definitely mentioned in connection with the court of the southern T'ang dynasty at Nanking, 937–75 A.D. This court practiced a life of luxury and enjoyed the sight of dancing girls, their feet clad with "bow-shoes", the upturned toes of which resembled the bow of a Roman galley. The small feet of the sought-after dancers may have started the style, but it hardly explains the spread and long continuance of foot-binding, which has meant so much limitation, discomfort, and pain to so many individuals over so many years.

In the twelfth century the highly influential scholar-philosopher, Chu Hsi (1130–1200) was, according to Dr. Lin Yutang, "enthusiastic in introducing foot-binding in southern Fukien as a means of spreading Chinese culture and teaching the separation of men and women."

1 [In Ting Hsien (Province) -- Analyst]

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933)1954 AF12 North China AF12



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Although apparently accepted as part of Chinese culture in central China, the custom does not seem to have penetrated northern China to any great extent under the Liao, the Chin, or the early Yuan dynasty. By the first part of the fourteenth century, however, it must have become fairly general for Friar Odoric of Pordenone, who was in northern China for three years during the period 1322–28, says in his travelogue: "And with the women the great beauty is to have little feet; and for this reason mothers are accustomed, as soon as girls are born, to swathe their feet tightly so that they can never grow in the least."[12] Other early European or Western Asiatic travelers do not comment on the custom. Some Chinese authors of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, in mentioning the practice, apparently accept it as part of their mores.

The early Ming emperors, a Chinese dynasty, did not bandage the feet of their palace women, although foot-binding was practiced by a considerable proportion of their subjects.

When the Manchus, who did not practice foot-binding, came into power they endeavored to prohibit the custom among their Chinese subjects. Their first proscription was issued in Mukden in 1638. In 1645, the second year of his reign as Emperor of China, Shun Chih issued another edict against foot-binding and attempted to enforce it throughout the country. K'ang Hsi withdrew the ban as he found that while he could force the Chinese men to wear queues he could not compel the Chinese women to give up binding their feet. The custom, however, was not tolerated by the Manchu emperors in their palaces or in the banners (sections of the army).

Among the Chinese, objection to the practice apparently did not begin to crop up until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Yüan Mei (1716–99), Li Ju-chen (ca. 1763–ca. 1830), and Yu Cheng-hsieh (1775–1840) all wrote against it. In 1896–98 K'ang Yu-wei (1858–1927) made it one of the reforms for which he struggled.

The Protestant missionaries have steadily worked against the practice and have been one of the many influences that have combined to arouse public opinion against foot-binding and bring about the discontinuance of the custom.

Among the females in the 515 families who were born before 1890, and so were forty years of age or over in 1929, foot-binding was prac- 304 178

12. Sir Henry Yule, *Cathay and the Way Thither*, rev. Cordier, printed for the Hakluyt Society (London, 1916).

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 AF12 North China AF12



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tically universal, 99.2 per cent. One wonders how it was that four women in that group did not have bound feet. (See Table 9.)

There were six women with unbound feet in each of the next two younger five year age groups, born between 1890 and 1899. The increase in numbers was not large but the proportion with unbound feet rose to over five per cent in each group. Even in the rural communities, a few families were beginning to accept new ideas and leave their daughters' feet unbound, despite the fact that later on it might be difficult to find husbands for the girls.

Many new ideas came in after Boxer year, 1900, and the spirit of change evidently reached the Ting Hsien countryside with considerable rapidity. Eighteen and one-half per cent of the girls born during the five years from 1900 through 1904, for whom foot-binding would ordinarily start from 1903 through 1907, did not have their feet bound. In the next five-year age group, 1905–9, the proportion more than doubled, reaching 40.3 per cent.

The biggest change of all came in the group born from 1910 to 1914. These were the years of the Revolution and the founding of the Republic. New ideas were being adopted in many fields and many old customs were breaking down. The proportion of girls with unbound feet was 80.5 per cent—double that of the next older five-year age group.

In the 1915–19 group, 94.4 per cent of the girls had unbound feet. The 5.6 per cent with bound feet were all born before 1917. All the girls under thirteen years of age were reported to have natural, unbound feet.

If these figures are typical we can say that foot-binding came to an end in Ting Hsien in 1919. Knowing the general conservatism of the countryside it is remarkable to see how this old and well-nigh universal custom, which had lasted almost one thousand years and had successfully defied imperial authority, disappeared completely in these Ting Hsien families in a period of about thirty years, about one generation.[13]

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The queue, which had been practically universal with the men before 1911, disappeared very rapidly after the downfall of the Manchus. In 1929 only three were left among the 1,835 males in the 515 families.

13. See Samuel Couling, "Anti-footbinding" and "Footbinding", *Encyclopedia Sinica* (Oxford University Press, London, 1917); Lin Yutang, *My Country and My People* (Reynal and Hitchcock, New York, 1935); Lin Yutang, *T'ien Hsia Monthly*, vol. I, pp. 127–50; Paul Pelliot, *T'oung Pao*, 1920–21, p. 179; K. Chimin Wong and Lien-teh Wu, *History of Chinese Medicine*, 2nd ed. (Tientsin Press, Ltd.)

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Their wearers did not belong to the very old group, but were men between 46 and 55 years of age.

A surprisingly small number of persons with physical disabilities were reported in the 515 families.[1] The total was 25. Only three of these were females. There were three blind men and three men and one woman were blind in one eye. Two men were dumb and six were deaf. Lameness was serious enough to be reported for four men and two women. Two men had paralyzed arms and two paralyzed fingers.

With less than one per cent of the group reported as having physical disabilities one cannot but wonder whether the report was incomplete or whether the extra difficulties of life had eliminated others who might have been stricken.

*Home Ownership*

Home ownership was almost universal for these Ting Hsien families. The figures are 98.8 per cent for the 5,255 families and 96.3 per cent for the 515 families. In a group of families living in Peking only 21.2 per cent owned their homes.[14]

About two-thirds of the non-owners were given the use of their homes, so house rent was paid by only 0.4 per cent of the 5,255 families and by 1.4 per cent of the 515 families. The small proportion of home renters makes it evident that a large proportion of those classed as tenant farmers owned their homes, even though they rented all of the land they farmed. In the 1st District 11.4 per cent of the families were tenant farmers, in the hsien only 4.7 per cent.

The high percentage of home ownership indicates very definitely that Ting Hsien had a steady, settled population and that almost all of the families had been in the area long enough to accumulate the funds needed to buy their homes. Quite a number of the families said that their ancestors came to Ting Hsien about 500 years ago.

In the 71 villages in the 1st District the average family residence area was 2.1 mu, about 100 x 150 feet. In that area the family would have its living quarters, housing for any animals, and storage for all farm equipment and for its food, fodder, and fertilizer.

The total residence area in the 71 villages varied from eight to 800 mu. Sixteen villages had less than 50 mu each. Fourteen had 300 or more mu. The average per family varied from 0.4 mu to 8.2 mu, but

14. Gamble, *op. cit.*

1 [In Ting Hsien -- Analyst]

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TABLE 9. AGE OF FEMALES WITH BOUND AND UNBOUND FEET
(515 families)

| Age | Unbound Feet | Bound Feet | Total | Per Cent Bound |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Under 5 | 294 | – | 294 | – |
| 5–9 | 169 | – | 169 | – |
| 10–14 | 152 | 9 | 161 | 5.6 |
| 15–19 | 120 | 29 | 149 | 19.5 |
| 20–24 | 52 | 77 | 129 | 59.7 |
| 25–29 | 24 | 106 | 130 | 81.5 |
| 30–34 | 6 | 97 | 103 | 94.1 |
| 35–39 | 6 | 103 | 109 | 94.5 |
| 40 and over | 4 | 488 | 492 | 99.2 |
| | 827 | 909 | 1,736 | |

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TABLE 10. RESIDENCE AREA PER FAMILY
(village averages, 1st District)

| Mu | Villages | Per Cent | Mu | Villages | Per Cent |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Under 0.5 | 2 | 2.8 | 3.0–3.4 | 7 | 9.9 |
| 0.5–0.9 | 16 | 22.6 | 3.5–3.9 | 3 | 4.2 |
| 1.0–1.4 | 15 | 21.1 | 4.0–4.4 | 2 | 2.8 |
| 1.5–1.9 | 8 | 11.3 | 4.5–4.9 | 2 | 2.8 |
| 2.0–2.4 | 10 | 14.1 | 5 and over | 2 | 2.8 |
| 2.5–2.9 | 4 | 5.6 | Total | 71 | 100.0 |

TABLE 11. RESIDENCE AREA, TWO VILLAGES

| Mu | Families | Per Cent |
|---|---|---|
| Under 0.5 | 113 | 31.7 |
| 0.5–0.9 | 138 | 38.6 |
| 1.0–1.4 | 72 | 20.2 |
| 1.5–1.9 | 19 | 5.3 |
| 2.0–2.4 | 11 | 3.1 |
| 2.5 and over | 4 | 1.1 |
| | 357 | 100.0 |

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## TABLE 94. INDUSTRIAL WAGES[1]

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Per Day* | | *(Per Month, cont.)* | |
| Eye medicine | $0.40–1.00 | Tailors | 9.00 |
| Sawyers | .50 | Iron | 7.00 |
| Mat sheds | .45 | Seal cutters | 7.00 |
| *Per Month* | | Copper and tin | 6.00 |
| Leather: | | Cart makers | 5.00 |
| Headman | 30.00 | Brick kiln | 4.00 |
| Trained worker | 12.00 | *Per Year* | |
| Graduate apprentice | 10.00 | Cotton ginning, laborers | 60–70 |
| Bookkeeper | 10.00 | Noodles | 60 |
| Foreman | 5.00 | Felt mats | 40–50 |
| Cook | 4.00 | Peanut oil | 30–40 |
| Laborer | 3.50 | Oil | 30 |

[1] Tips and presents generally added about $20 per year for workers and $10 for apprentices. Cost of meals was about $4.50 per month.

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## TABLE 95. INCREASE IN NUMBER OF FAMILIES AND FAMILIES WEAVING IN ONE VILLAGE, 1882–1932

| *Date* | *Total Families* | *Families Weaving* | *Per Cent Weaving* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1882 | 155 | 90 | 58 |
| 1887 | 157 | 96 | 61 |
| 1892 | 158 | 110 | 70 |
| 1897 | 160 | 120 | 75 |
| 1902 | 162 | 125 | 77 |
| 1907 | 164 | 130 | 79 |
| 1912 | 165 | 130 | 79 |
| 1917 | 169 | 135 | 80 |
| 1922 | 172 | 140 | 81 |
| 1927 | 177 | 150 | 85 |
| 1932 | 180 | 154 | 86 |

## TABLE 96. NUMBER AND KINDS OF LOOMS IN ONE VILLAGE, 1912–1932

| *Year* | *Iron* | *Wood* | | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | *Improved* | *Original* | |
| 1912 | – | 20 | 260 | 280 |
| 1917 | – | 45 | 225 | 270 |
| 1922 | 15 | 72 | 168 | 255 |
| 1927 | 36 | 84 | 126 | 246 |
| 1932 | 69 | 122 | 48 | 239 |

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782 selves were driven south of Ting Hsien. There was looting when the Fengtien forces left Ting Hsien, and more when they returned and recaptured the area after fighting inside the city walls. This is said to be one of the worst times in Ting Hsien in recent years. After they had one experience with the looting of the Fengtien troops, it is not to be wondered at that the people turned to their gods for protection against a repetition of that experience. The year 1928 was not included in the period of our study of special religious expenditure, so we have no report concerning special services that may have been held because of the fighting and looting of that year.

Three villages spent $440 praying for protection from sickness, an average of $147 per village. One village reported spending $600 during five years for services seeking protection from hail. This total probably included a large amount spent for some special item such as the renovation of the temple. Perhaps an annual service was held in anticipation of possible damage. Hail damaged the crops in both 1923 and 1926.

There was damage from floods every year from 1922 to 1926, but only one village in the Experimental District reported holding special services to ask for divine protection from that sort of damage. The expenditure was only $70, so probably only one, or not more than two, services were held during the five years.

The largest average expenditure was made in connection with reappearances of the gods. Three villages reported a total expenditure of $1,150, or an average of $385 per village, for such services. This amount probably included some expenditure for the renovation of the temples as well as the cost of the celebration services.

During the 12 years from 1915 to 1926, the record of calamities shows seven years with flood, three with drought, five with hail, seven with locusts, three with sickness, cholera or plague, one with frost, and three with looting.

511 The families in our budget study (see Chapter V) spent an average of 75 cents when they went to the temple fair, but most of that was for entertainment rather than for any religious items. Their expenditure for religion averaged 70 cents for the year, most of it for paper money and incense.

346 One wishes the records were available to show what special events or
●178 particular influences were connected with the erection of the various
771 temples and what were the special periods of temple building and re-
871

2: Gamble S-5 (1926-1933)1954 [illegible] North China [illegible]



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building. We know that the history of some temples goes back to Ming, Yuan, and even Sung times, but, for the present at least, the other questions cannot be answered for Ting Hsien. In order to determine how much of a change there had been in recent years, the village elders of the Experimental District were asked what temples they had in their villages, what temples they used to have, and when any discontinued temples had been given up. The comparison of the two lists showed a tremendous decrease. The fifty years from 1882 to 1932 were a period of temple destruction rather than of temple building or rebuilding. Increasing contacts with the outside world, modern education, and many other influences had apparently weakened the hold of the gods on the people, and through the years a large proportion of the temples had been given up, converted to other uses, sold, or torn down.

Before 1882 there were 435 temples in the 62 villages of the Experimental District, but in 1928 the number was only 104. Three hundred and thirty-one temples, 76 per cent of the original list, had been given up. Before 1899 only two temples were reported as being discontinued, one in 1882 and one in 1889. From 1899 through 1917 there were only two years when at least one temple was not given up. Those years were 1901 and 1903. Between 1917 and 1928 only two were discontinued, one in 1926 and one in 1928. Eighty-two per cent of the discontinued temples were given up during three years 1900, 1914, and 1915. Twenty-seven were destroyed in 1900, Boxer year, largely as a result of the foreign troops coming to Ting Hsien after the capture of Peking. Two hundred were discontinued in 1914 and another 45 were given up in 1915. The influence of the Revolution and of the magistrate Sun Fa Hsü seems to have been responsible for this big decrease. Taking office in May, 1914, Sun came to Ting Hsien with the idea of getting rid of many of the old customs and promoting modern education throughout the entire hsien. He put pressure on the village elders to get them to give up the temples and to open schools. This program was opposed by many of the villages. In one part of the hsien some 10,000 people joined the Catholic church hoping that thereby they might avoid the additional taxes that would be necessary to provide for the school budget. In this they were unsuccessful. Magistrate Sun was in office less than two and a half years, but during that time 68 per cent of the existing temples were discontinued. Forty-eight per cent of the schools of the Experi-

2:Gamble S-5 (1926-1933) 1954 AF12 North China AF12



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mental District were opened during the five years from 1912 to 1916, practically all of them during the last two years of that period.

As money was not readily available for the erection of any considerable number of school buildings, the elders of not a few villages were willing to accept the suggestion of the magistrate that they turn some of the available and relatively little used temples into school rooms. Most of them had been built by popular subscription, so it was not difficult to turn them over to other uses if the village elders could be persuaded that the new uses were a public benefit. It is rather surprising, however, to find that even as early as 1914 the old beliefs had been so undermined that the people were able to see so many temples given up without too much fear of the wrath of the gods.

The rent of land that had been given to some of the temples was, in several cases at least, transferred from the temple to the village school as the popularity of the temple waned and the village was required to expand its educational program.

If the change in the number of temples in the Experimental District can be taken as typical of the entire hsien, there used to be some 3,575 temples in the 453 villages and some 2,000 of these were given up during 1914 and 1915 while Sun Fa-hsü was in office. This seems to be an almost impossible number, but there does not seem to be any reason why a larger proportion should be given up in the Experimental District than in the rest of the hsien. Even if the temples discontinued during those years were only one-half the estimated number, it still would show that new ideas brought in by the Revolution of 1911 and by Magistrate Sun had a tremendous influence on the external expression of the religious life of the hsien. As only two temples were given up between 1917 and 1928, the wave of anti-religious feeling that started as anti-Christian about 1921, but gradually became anti-all-religion as it reached its height in 1927–1928, seems to have had but little influence on the religious life of Ting Hsien. The movement centered in South and Central China and in the cities and, as far as we can see, did not greatly affect the rural areas of North China.

The 1882 list of temples in the Experimental District shows that all but one of the villages had one or more temples. The single exception was a village in which, in 1928, 72 per cent of the families were Mohammedans. Thirty-six per cent of the villages had from one to five temples, 48 per cent from six to 10, and 15 per cent had more than 10

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temples. Only one village had more than 17. For it the number was 22. The average was seven temples per village.

On the 1928 list 50 per cent of the Experimental District villages had no temples and only 6.4 per cent instead of 63 per cent had more than five temples. The maximum was 11. The average for all the villages was 1.7 or 3.4 for the villages that had temples.

While 30 villages had given up all their temples, seven still had the same number. One wishes it were possible to determine what were the differences in belief, experience, and contact with new ideas that led one village with 22 temples and another with 17 to give up all of them and one with 17 and another with 15 temples to discontinue all but one each while one village with 12 temples kept all but one and one village with seven temples and another with eight gave up none.

If we assume that the number of families in each village remained constant from 1882 to 1928, one village had, in 1882, one temple for every four families and there were six villages where there were less than 10 families per temple. In two of these six villages the number was still under 10 in 1928. In 1882 40 per cent of the villages had less than 20 families and 92 per cent had less than 50 families per temple. The maximum was 90, the average 24. In 1928 only 8 per cent of the villages had less than 20 families per temple. In only 13 per cent, instead of 92 per cent, was the number less than 50 families per temple. In six villages it was over 100 and in two it was over 345. The maximum was 362. One-half the villages had no temples. For the 62 villages the average number of families per temple was 100 or 10 more than the earlier maximum. For the entire hsien the 1930 average was 78 families per temple.

The village elders reported the 1928 use of 135, 41 per cent, of the discontinued temples. Fifty-seven were used for school buildings; another 25 were being used for other public purposes, such as village offices and public storehouses; 47 had been sold to private owners and probably had been torn down for the material in them; two were being rented out, the rent going to the public funds of the village; three had been torn down and the land added to the village public land; one had been turned over to some monks and was used by them as their residence.

More than a proportionate number of the larger temples were given up, possibly because they would provide better school accommodations,

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perhaps because of the cost involved in repairing them if they had fallen into disrepair. In 1928 83 per cent of the Experimental District temples had only one chien and only 3 per cent had more than three chien. In the 1882 list the corresponding figures were 70 per cent and 9 per cent. According to the earlier list the average number of temple chien per village was 15. In 1928 it was 2.8.

In 396 temples of the earlier list the gods were represented by images, in 31 by pictures painted on the walls. There were 2,157 images in the 396 temples, an average for the temples with images of 5.4. One-half of the temples had three images and another 14 per cent had only one image. Forty-eight temples, 12 per cent, had 10 or more images. The maximum was 116. Of these 48 larger temples, only six were maintained in 1928.

In 1928 there were 78 temples with images and 26 with pictures. The number of images was 404 or an average of 5.2. This was only slightly lower than the 1882 average. There was not more difference because one temple with 116 images was included in both lists. If that temple is omitted, the 1928 average was 3.7 images per temple. One would naturally expect a low average as 83 per cent of the temples on the 1928 list had only one chien and on a single altar there is hardly room for more than one large image or three smaller ones.

A comparison of the 1928 and 1882 lists shows that while 76 per cent of all the temples had been given up, 85 per cent of those with five or more images had been discontinued, 91 per cent of those with 15 or more, and 94 per cent of those with 20 or more images.

Because there are some 18 different names of Buddhist temples on the earlier list, but only five on the 1928 list, our first impression was that the non-Buddhist gods had the stronger hold on the people and that a larger proportion of the Buddhist temples had been given up than was true of the other groups. Further analysis of the figures showed that the opposite was true. The Taoist, Official, and Individual groups lost from 75 to 78 per cent of their temples but only 70 per cent of the Buddhist temples were discontinued. The difference is not large, but it would seem to suggest that the Buddhist gods or more especially Kuan Yin, to whom in her various manifestations some 91 per cent of the Buddhist temples are dedicated, had a stronger hold on the hearts of the people than most of the other gods.

Two-thirds of the temples dedicated to Kuan Yin had been given up

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but of the more popular deities, those with four or more temples, she was the only one that, in 1928, had more than 30 per cent of the number in 1882. Yü Huang, the Pearly Emperor, had only one left out of 22, a 95 per cent loss. The decrease in the temples dedicated to the other female deities was 77 per cent or just about the average loss. For all of the goddesses together, the decrease was 70 per cent. Their temples were 21 per cent of the earlier list but were 27 per cent of the 1928 list.

Some new temples were built after 1928 and others were renovated. We have not attempted a study of the reasons for this activity, but it seems to indicate that some of the people were turning again to the old gods. Considering the events of the years immediately following 1925, this is hardly surprising. Chinese armies marched through and occupied the district. There was fighting, bombing from airplanes, looting, heavier taxes, and extraordinary demands for money, supplies, and men. Unable to get help and protection from the forces of this world, it is not surprising that some of the people came to feel that their only hope was in the forces of the spirit world and that their help should be sought through special services, the rebuilding of temples fallen into disrepair, and the erection of new shrines.

Soon after the uniting of the country in 1928 the Nationalist government issued a decree concerning the temples. Those dedicated to the sages and worthies of preceding ages were to be kept up. This list included the three mythical emperors, Fu Hsi, Shen Nung, Huang Ti, Lei Ts'u (who first reared silk worms), Ts'ang Chieh (the inventor of writing), Hou Chi (the Harvest Patron), Emperor Yü, Confucius, Mencius, Kung Shu Pan, Kuan Yü, and Yueh Fei. The temples and churches of the religious sect teaching theism with a pure and right intention were to be continued. These included the followers of Sakyamuni and Lao Tzu, Mohammedanism and Christianity.

The temples to be suppressed were those in which purely legendary personages were worshiped with no practical utility. These included the temples of the stellar spirits, the sun, the moo , etc., of Huo Shen the fire god, of K'uei Hsing the god of literature, of Wen Ch'ang (the cult of the battleflag), of the genii of the mountains, rivers, and earth, of the five holy peaks, the four rivers, the river spirits, the Dragon Kings, the Ministry of Thunder, of T'ai Shan, Tung Yueh, Ch'eng Huang, and T'u Ti; also the temples offending against public morality by playing on the credulity of people for gain, the temples of Chang

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Hsien, Sung Tzu, Niang Niang, Ts'ai Shen, Erh Lang, Sun Hou Tzu the monkey god, Wen Shen, Hsüan T'an the god of riches, Shih Ch'ien, and Hu Hsien the fox spirit.

The decree marked for suppression a large part of the Ting Hsien temples, but, up to 1935, there seems to have been no serious effort to enforce it in North China. It seemed then that, lacking governmental pressure, the number of temples would probably diminish very gradually, that as the less popular temples fell into disrepair they would be given up, but that the belief in the more popular deities was so widespread and so deeply imbedded in the life of the people that it would continue for a long time. What influence the war with Japan and the Japanese occupation had on the religious life of Ting Hsien is unknown.

Freedom of religion is part of the constitution of the new Central People's Government, but it is reported that when the Communists were in control of parts of Kiangsi province they destroyed all the temples and shrines in the area. How many temples will survive in Ting Hsien?

*Temple Fairs*

Fairs held to honor the gods and to present them with incense, feasts, and entertainment combined religious worship, amusement, recreation, business, and sociability. They were the largest public activities associated with any of the temples. Thousands of people came from neighboring villages and even farther afield and there was great activity during the three, four, or more days of the fair. Free theatrical performances were regularly part of the program and were very popular.

Many of the fairs have a long history but we also found that new ones were being organized at the time of our study.

While the fairs usually were held to honor one of the more popular gods and worship was regularly part of the program, in at least one town there were two annual fairs that had no religious connection.

Not every temple or every village or even every market village had a fair. The city, two of its three suburbs, and 35 of the 453 towns and villages held fairs. How they were distributed throughout the hsien is shown on the hsien map on page 5. The map also shows the month when the fairs were held. Fifty was the total number reported. Six fairs were listed in the city, four in one town, three in another, and two in

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TABLE 112. TEMPLES IN EXPERIMENTAL DISTRICT VILLAGES BEFORE 1882 AND IN 1928

| | *Before 1882* | *1928* | | *Before 1882* | *1928* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wu Tao Miao | 68 | 17 | San Huang Miao | 3 | 1 |
| Lao Mu Miao | 54 | 19 | Ho Shen Miao | 2 | 1 |
| Kuan Ti Miao | 40 | 10 | Wu Sheng Lao Mu Miao | 2 | 1 |
| Chen Wu Miao | 37 | 11 | Ch'eng Huang Miao | 1 | 1 |
| San Kuan Miao | 32 | 9 | Ch'i T'ien Ta Sheng Miao | 1 | 1 |
| Nai Nai Miao | 22 | 5 | Chou Kung Miao | 1 | 1 |
| Yü Huang Miao | 22 | 1 | Fo Yeh Miao | 1 | 1 |
| Lung Wang Miao | 21 | 4 | Han Tsu Miao | 1 | 1 |
| Yao Wang Miao | 18 | 5 | Li Ching Miao | 1 | 1 |
| Ma Wang Miao | 17 | 3 | Lo Han Miao | 1 | 1 |
| Ch'ung Wang Miao | 9 | 1 | Lung Mu Miao | 1 | 1 |
| Kuan Yin Miao | 7 | 2 | San Ch'ing Kuan | 1 | 1 |
| Erh Lang Miao | 6 | 1 | Ts'ai Shen Miao | 1 | 1 |
| T'ai Kung Miao | 4 | 1 | Wen Miao | 1 | 1 |
| T'u Ti Miao | 4 | 1 | | | |

*All Given Up by 1928*

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ta Szu | 12 | Lao Chang Miao | 1 |
| San I Miao | 5 | Lao Chün Miao | 1 |
| Ch'i Shen Miao | 3 | Liu Hsiu Miao | 1 |
| Wu Lung Sheng Mu Miao | 3 | Lung Ch'üan Szu | 1 |
| Ch'ung Ning Szu | 2 | Mi Le Szu | 1 |
| Fo Kuang Szu | 2 | Ni Ku An | 1 |
| Wen Shen Miao | 2 | Pa Ch'a Miao | 1 |
| Yung Ning Szu | 2 | Pai Ma Szu | 1 |
| An Le Szu | 1 | Pei Yüeh Miao | 1 |
| Ching Yeh Szu | 1 | Ta Fo Szu | 1 |
| Feng Huang Szu | 1 | Ti Tsang An | 1 |
| Fu Ch'ang Szu | 1 | T'ien Chen Szu | 1 |
| Hsiao Szu | 1 | T'ien Hsien Ling Mu Miao | 1 |
| Hsing Fu Szu | 1 | Ts'ang Ku Miao | 1 |
| Hsing Yuan Szu | 1 | Tso Fo Szu | 1 |
| Hung Men Szu | 1 | Wu Shen Miao | 1 |
| K'ai Ming Szu | 1 | | |

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871 tioning. Relations among students and between the principal and pupils are intimate. Many of them are relatives of the principal.

872 School subjects and texts are practically the same as in a city school of poor standing. Attendance is not strict. Teaching is not efficient. Collective recitation in a loud voice is still the most popular method in teaching language and civics.

When parents send their children to school, they have in mind that teachers will give their juniors a good training in knowledge and character. They may want a change in their children's occupation, but they certainly do not want any change in village mores and institutions.

872 178 Whether the old folks want it or not, this school has slowly but surely introduced the younger generations into the culture of a larger world. The texts they read have nothing about their own village customs. They have to read even the life stories of non-Chinese personalities. While informal education tends to conserve and thus forward cultural continuity, school education may lead the younger generations to give up their parents' ways of activity.

875 One more fact may be added. The school teacher who is a bit over thirty years of age is a very capable leader in the village. He is active both in and out of the village. Whenever officials, Chinese or not, happen to cause the villagers trouble, he is the person to help out and to negotiate with them. At home he tends to conserve the old ways, outside home he leads the villagers to new ways of activity. He is a marginal man, but his personality is well integrated.[22]

## Social Communication

571 The degree of intimacy in the social relations of the villagers varies with the individual. Some are more communicative while others are less. Inside the village, there are circles of social contact and communication. Some of the contacts are voluntary while others are not. The leaders are naturally the foci of social orientation and public attention, but they may have separate as well as common followers. Some of the followers are nearer to the social focus

22 On the concept of marginal man, see R. E. Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," in E. W. Burgess (ed.), Personality and the Social Group, Chicago, 1929, pp. 64-77; also Everett Stonequist, The Marginal Man, New York, 1937.

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one of the duck-raising families has a brother in the village who is a good farmer. Members of the families of these two brothers seldom see each other in spite of their kinship tie.

The woolen factory in the market-town attracts several female- as well as male-workers from this village. Several sons of P'ing-chiao-tsun families have also been attracted to the city factories. But so far the effect of industrialization upon family life is not observable. Perhaps the time is still too short for these families to feel the effect. Also recently, a Mr. Y- has brought into the village a few machines for woolen manufacture. Workers, males and females, adults and children, are attracted from P'ing-chiao-tsun itself and other villages. Industrialization is surely taking place, and another couple of years will tell its effects.

As to consumption habits, the village folks have begun to smoke cigarettes from city factories. The cloth for clothing is no longer home-spun but comes from city factories as well. The tea-leaves and the household utensils come from places far away. P'ing-chiao-tsun has no electric light and its people cannot afford to visit movie houses. Members of the upper family are exceptions, but their habits and manners have no effect on the rest.

Naturally, the school and the political bodies, previously mentioned, are agents of urbanization. Our student- and faculty-investigators are also urban agents. While we do not look queer to the villagers, nevertheless they are interested in our habits of living and very often keep on asking for details about them.

The last but not the least important is the changing conception of time in the minds of the villagers. While time-clocks may still be regarded as decorations, the people have begun to use them to count their time in hours if not in minutes. The three counts of morning, afternoon and evening are getting too simple for them.

Meanwhile, the city of Peiping is changing toward an industrial urbanism. Thus the process of urbanization in P'ing-chiao-tsun is both old and new. While the residents of the city might have abandoned their old ways, the village folks may still keep them. But the new ways are surely coming, slow as they may be. The structure of this village may be different from that of an American rural community,[29]

29 Charles J. Galpin, **Rural Life**, New York, 1923; J. H. Kolb and Edmund de S. Brunner, **A Study of Rural Society: Its Organization and Changes**, Boston and New York, 1940.

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but it too feels the pressure of urban ways as the latter has felt and still feels it. Metropolitan ways of living[30] are in the making. The people of P'ing-chiao-tsun will some day feel the need of changing their ways.

### Individuation

The relation of the individual to the family and to many other associations constantly occurs in the minds of the village folks. While he is born to a family, an individual gradually realizes that some day he will be free from the control or his parents and elders. With other associations, he feels that his participation may be at least partially voluntary. Whatever the case may be, in the solution of their daily problems, he finds the principle of cooperation most valuable, yet in his participation in group life, he discovers the problem of individuation, or his emancipation from the control of a group or groups. Thus the relation of individual to society presents itself as a problem to the P'ing-chiao-tsun folks as it has been presented to the eminent philosophers in all ages in all human communities. While individuation is always going on with the people in the family and in the village, as a problem it is growing more acute under the pressure of urbanization. In the present section, only a few general observations are made.

No two individuals in P'ing-chiao-tsun are exactly alike. While the sociologists may claim that personality is the subjective aspect of culture,[31] not a single individual has acquired the whole of the culture of P'ing-chiao-tsun.

On the surface of it, all P'ing-chiao-tsun folks look similar. Surely, they are similar in many many ways, but each of them has his own idiosyncrasies. They differ from one another in age, sex, physique, intelligence, temperament, education, family life, associations, and a hundred other ways. All these factors working in combination have undoubtedly given each of them an individuality.

They all may have the same ideals, yet they all differ. In Ping-chiao-tsun, the rule is that the husband should dominate the wife, and yet as in the country at large, there are henpecked husbands. While

30 R. D. McKenzie, **The Metropolitan Community**, New York, 1933; also The University of Chicago sociological series.

31 Ellsworth Faris, **The Nature of Human Nature and Other Essays in Social Psychology**, New York, 1937, Part I, Article II, pp. 21-35.

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and wealth which his father once enjoyed. In our first revisit, he was undoubtedly the most influential man in the district. As principal of the school and deputy head of the *lien-pao*, he had both fame and power. For additional income he practiced medicine. He learned the old technique of medical treatment from his mother and the friends of his father. He tried to combine this old method with the new ways which he learned from his friend in the city. In his home, no one could fail to observe the amount of money he invested in medical supplies.

Returning to changes in the school, when Mr. H. was removed from his office as school principal, he had the desks and chairs which he said were his own moved back to his own home. A man of forty-five was sent by the Bureau of Education of the Municipal Government of Peiping to take his place. In addition, there were two teachers to teach a group of sixty boys and girls of six to fifteen years of age. Textbooks were replaced when the war was over. There was not any sign of Japanese influence left in the village.

On the whole, the villagers had kept their old ways of thinking, feeling and doing. Whatever superficial changes might have been introduced, they were formal and had slight effect on the belief and conception of life of the villagers. The old ways of the villagers had a high degree of persistency. While certain villagers may have had difficulty in surviving the external and the internal wars, their ways of doing, feeling and thinking may survive long and well.

4: Burgess E-4,5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12



873 (12) The Student Movement, with its local and nation-wide unions, shows its power first in its leadership in the demonstration against the signing by China of the Versailles Treaty in 1919, and again in 1925 after the Shanghai shooting incident of May 30, when it was the organized students who by lectures and the promotion of local demonstrations were the driving force behind the national protests against "unequal treaties." [1]

185 (13) A striking contrast between present-day China and China before the founding of the Republic is the increasing popular interest in the international status of the nation. This interest is spreading especially in the South and finds its chief expression in a popular demand for the revision of "unequal treaties." This movement crystallized and gained momentum after the Shanghai shooting incident of May 30, 1925, and has affected the official pronouncements of both the Northern and the Southern governments as manifested in the insistence on the rescinding of the special treaty rights held by foreigners residing in China.

• 178 (14) The development of the modern factory system has a direct bearing on the future of many types of guilds. The best available statistics of this development were compiled by the Chinese Government Bureau of Economic Information. The following figures, which show the rapid increase of factories and the magnitude of investment in modern type industry, were sent to the writer by Mr. M. A. Gilbert, General Secretary of the Bureau:

The first establishment in the form of a factory came into existence as early as 1862, when Viceroy Tseng Kuo-fan of

[1] Dr. Tsi C. Wang has vividly portrayed the activities of the Student Movement in his book, *The Youth Movement* (New York, 1927). The Renassaince Movement, the Student Movement and the demonstrations against Christianity are all shown by Dr. Wang to be aspects of the awakening of the youth of China.

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Anhwei completed the building of an arsenal at Anking for the manufacture of arms and ammunition and the construction of steamships. Side by side with this venerable statesman, Viceroy Li Hung-chang proposed and established in Shanghai and Soochow works for the output of guns. The years 1862 to 1881 could be considered a period of industrial development of military supplies. The following thirteen years were characterized by great activity in the industrial field of a purely commercial nature. Weaving factories and mints were the feature establishments of the time. In the next thirteen years, competition became very keen between Chinese and foreign enterprises. During this period remarkable progress was recorded in the establishment of cotton mills, glass manufactories and machinery works. Ever since 1907, industries have developed by leaps and bounds. The actual commencement of this period was shortly after the conclusion of the World War. In 1920, there were as many as 70 factories established. The next year had an insignificant decrease of nine establishments. The following list will show the establishment of factories every year from 1901 to 1924:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1901 | 12 | 1914 | 24 |
| 1902 | 4 | 1915 | 33 |
| 1903 | 4 | 1916 | 30 |
| 1904 | 7 | 1917 | 18 |
| 1905 | 15 | 1918 | 19 |
| 1906 | 29 | 1919 | 21 |
| 1907 | 33 | 1920 | 70 |
| 1908 | 20 | 1921 | 61 |
| 1909 | 21 | 1922 | 46 |
| 1910 | 18 | 1923 | 14 |
| 1911 | 14 | 1924 | 11 |
| 1912 | 13 | | |
| 1913 | 28 | Total | 565 |

This total of 565 factories in operation in China in 1924 had an aggregate capitalization of $224,143,449, figures later than that year being unobtainable. Classified by industries, they are shown as follows:

4: Burgess E-4,5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12



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| | *Number of factories* | *Total capital* |
|---|---|---|
| Cotton weaving and spinning | 129 | $99,994,420 |
| Flour milling | 97* | 25,839,000 |
| Match | 66 | 6,821,000 |
| Soap, candle, etc | 35 | 2,098,000 |
| Silk weaving | 23 | 4,625,000 |
| Metal, machinery, etc. | 23 | 23,205,000 |
| Oil refining | 21 | 4,336,000 |
| Tobacco | 20 | 8,540,000 |
| Chemical | 14 | 2,963,929 |
| Paper | 13 | 9,475,000 |
| Leather | 11 | 5,452,000 |
| Porcelain, earthenware | 10 | 1,270,000 |
| Brick, tiles | 10 | 564,000 |
| Wine distilling | 9 | 2,800,000 |
| Cement | 7 | 4,925,000 |
| Glass | 6 | 1,660,000 |
| Sugar refining | 4 | 10,720,000 |
| Camphor | 4 | 155,300 |
| Salt refining | 4 | 2,489,000 |
| Egg albumen, yolk, etc. | 5 | 325,000 |
| Soda | 4 | 900,000 |
| Miscellaneous | 50 | 5,585,000 |

These figures only cover the principal factories, and there are many others of a smaller scale not herein mentioned. If distributed by provinces, the following are the totals:

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Chihli | 94 | Chekiang | 30 |
| Fengtien | 17 | Hupeh | 26 |
| Kirin | 19 | Hunan | 7 |
| Heilungkiang | 3 | Shensi | 3 |
| Shantung | 42 | Kansu | 3 |
| Honan | 17 | Szechwan | 12 |
| Shansi | 10 | Kwangtung | 19 |
| Kiangsu | 219 | Kwangsi | 1 |
| Anhwei | 11 | Abroad | 4 |
| Kiangsi | 16 | | |
| Fukien | 12 | Total | 565 |

A glance at the map of China will show that there is a

*Less 3 suspended at Peking with $50,000 capital.

4: Burgess E-4, 5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12



very large concentration of factories in the provinces in which the big port cities of Shanghai, Tiensien, Hankow, and Canton are situated. Three hundred fifty-eight or 63 per cent of the 565 factories are in these provinces and most of them are in these four cities.

(15) The spread of a labor movement organized along Western lines has been described by Dr. Ta Chen.[1] The Third National Conference of Labor held in Canton in May, 1926, was attended by 400 delegates representing as many unions and 1,240,000 workmen from 19 provinces.

Reports were presented and resolutions passed on the following subjects: Organization of the labor movement; reorganization and working of trade unions; objectives and program of the economic struggle; strikes; the relations between workers and peasants; workers' education; young workers and the trade union movement; unemployment; cooperation; labor legislation; and *the right of association* and conditions of work.[2]

In many cases it is possible to see the direct relation between one of these many changes and guild organization or procedure. These complex changes have been accompanied by a general variability from customary behavior and by a sense of mental unrest and insecurity which though far more difficult to describe is no less significant in considering the changes in guild life.

## THE CITY OF PEKING

To give the proper social setting of the particular guilds we are studying, it would be necessary to describe in great detail the life of the city of Peking. Fortunately, such a study has already been made.[3] For our purposes it will be

[1] Ta Chen, *The Labor Movement in China* (Honolulu, 1927).

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[3] Gamble and Burgess, *op. cit.*

4: Burgess E-4, 5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12



in the guilds in Peking. The problem is a similar one although the government agencies now dealing with the guilds are more complicated.

Peking had in 1919 a population of 811,556,[1] of which an unusually large proportion were males — 63.5 per cent.[2] The reason for this undue proportion is the very large number of officials living in Peking without their families and the army of expectant officials awaiting appointment, and also the large male student population. In 1919 there were 16,879 students in modern-style high schools and colleges. The number has greatly increased since then. The large number of men and boys in shops and stores who have come in from the country, away from their families, is another factor.

Because Peking is a city with such a high percentage of officials and students, one looks in vain for any considerable body of local gentry. The official group comes from every province and practically from every city in China, and the students come from a similarly wide area. One would naturally suppose that the guilds in Peking would be less affected by the pressure of public opinion than would those in other cities, for there is little unity in the conglomerate group of temporary residents that make up the official and student ranks.

Modern industry has affected Peking very little indeed.

Other cities in China point with pride to the modern factories which they have established, but Peking has little industry that is efficient and on a modern basis. The city has long been a political rather than an industrial center, and the local octroi charges have tended to discourage the establishment of modern factories inside the walls. The principal examples of modern industry are the telephone company, the electric light company,

[1] Gamble and Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 99.

4: Burgess E-4, 5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12



water company, match factory, glass factory and government uniform factory. The telephone company, electric company and water company have covered practically the entire city with their lines, and all give fairly efficient service. 178 •

The match factory is reported to be doing work on thoroughly efficient modern lines, but employing a great number of children. A more detailed report cannot be given, as this was the one place in Peking to which we were denied admission.

The glass factory stands as a warning to those who would introduce modern methods and modern machinery in China without first training men to operate and care for the machines. The machinery was imported and the factory built at an expense of nearly one million dollars; but as no trained men were available, the machinery was broken and the factory had to be closed down.

While the big glass factory with its complicated machinery has been a failure, one of the Buddhist Temples in the South City is running a small factory turning out lamp chimneys and window glass, which require but little machinery. Two furnaces are kept in constant operation, and the work is done by some thirty workers and seventy apprentices. The workers are paid from $30 to $50 a month, while the apprentices receive from 50 cents to $3 a month. The hours of work are from 3 a. m. to 5 p. m.

The Government in its uniform factory, established by the Board of War in 1912, is making equipment for the army under modern factory conditions, and is using modern machinery and quantity production method in some lines, while in others the old system of hand work prevails, though on a larger scale than is ordinarily found in any of the Chinese shops.[1]

Peking is also a center of national finance and the headquarters not only of important Chinese banks but also of foreign organizations, which are centered there in large numbers. Their transactions, however, have little to do with the industrial situation in the city. 453

[1] Gamble and Burgess, *op. cit.*, pp. 2[illegible] 220.

4: Burgess E-4, 5 (1926-1927)1928 AF12 North China AF12



are being reorganized into labor unions. The laws and regulations both of the Republic and of the Peoples Party are restricting more and more the activities of both the craft and the commercial guilds and are making impossible many practices formerly common to the guilds. Compelling membership for all working in the same trade in a given area is forbidden. Strikes of workmen against employers formerly forbidden by law are now allowed. Guild courts are no longer allowed to punish offenders, and in the case of the commercial guilds, the courts of the Chamber of Commerce are largely taking the place of the old guild tribunals. The Chamber of Commerce Movement is enlarging the horizon of those engaged in commerce and gradually creating among the commercial guilds a provincial and national outlook where formerly there was only local interest.

### C. Contemporary Movements and the Guilds

The transformation of guild organization and function just described and summarized has a distinct relation to the various modern movements and changes which were outlined in the introduction.[1] With the possible exception of (8), improvements in public health, changes in the life of these institutions may be correlated with each one of the fifteen new tendencies enumerated. It must be acknowledged that the sanitary arrangements of Peking shops do not seem to have been affected by the modern movement for sanitation, nor by the health center in the East City. Setting aside this exception it is possible to show that recent general trends have not been without their effect on the subject of this study.

(1) Although it is true that in the Peking guilds themselves as yet modern Western-educated men have played a very small part, the prominence among the technicians and

[1] *Cf.* pp. 37-43.

4. Burgess E-4, 5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12



*441 *467 178

managers of the factories of the port cities of men educated in the universities of Europe and America or in the colleges of China, has undoubtedly been one of the factors making for the efficiency and expansion of the factories, which in turn have been successful competitors to the craft guilds. (2) The new educational system with its technical schools and colleges has already modified the apprentice system of Shanghai, while modern educated students with knowledge of the Western labor movement have played leading parts in organizing labor throughout China. (3) The improvement in the technical branches of the government evidenced especially in the reorganization of judicial procedure has had a direct effect in its regulation of the Chamber of Commerce Courts. (4) The extension of the telegraph and postal service; (5) the increased mileage of railroads; and (6) the building of good roads have facilitated the increase of domestic trade, both in home-manufactured and in imported goods, which in turn has enlarged the scope of activity of the commercial guilds, and has helped to introduce new products made at a distance which successfully compete with local craft-made goods. (7) The efficient police system of Peking has forbidden the old guild punishments, and now has a police representative at every guild meeting to see that affairs are carried on in an ordinary manner.

(9) The information gained by the geological survey is basic because of the light it has thrown on the mineral resources of China as an aid in the development of modern industry, which in turn affects the guilds.

(10) The increase of exports and imports has directly affected guild life. For example, the large exportation of Peking rugs and relationships resulting therefrom were the principal reasons for the breaking up of the rug guild, while the Brass Wash-Basin Guild disappeared when the cheaper enameled imported utensil was introduced into the market.

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(11) The Renaissance Movement, with its emphasis on the archaic and harmfully conservative character of the paternalistic system, whether in village, clan or guild, and its output of literature in the form of books, pamphlets or articles in the daily press advocating a reorganization of the industrial system, the necessity of a labor movement and the need of newer and more efficient methods of production, has had a powerful, though an indirect effect on the present trend of guild transformation. (12 and 13) In the nation-wide demonstrations of protest against "foreign aggression" as exemplified in the Shanghai shooting incident of May 30, 1925, local federations composed of representatives of the Chamber of Commerce, the Student Union and other organizations, took the lead. The driving force came from the students, but the stability and to a large extent the funds for such demonstrations came from the Chambers of Commerce, composed largely of guildsmen. The new nationalism is creating a wider and more than local interest among the members of the commercial guilds. (14) The direct effect of modern factories on guilds has been indicated in many connections, while (15) the new labor movement, partly an inevitable complement to the new industry and partly artificially stimulated by the new political groups, has gained momentum and is including within itself many reorganized guilds.

When asked to describe what he considered the principal cause for the weakening of authority and of morale in the Peking guilds, Mr. H. C. Chang replied that an expression he had often heard the guildsmen make would most directly answer this question: "*Che chi nien jen hsin huai la,*" or "During these recent years men's hearts are defective or impaired." He went on to explain that this expression signified that while formerly the individual conformed passively to common practice, nowadays no one knew where to find

4: Burgess E-4, 5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12



*444 his guildsmen. During recent years there has been no de-
*467 pendence on what any one would do; each seemed interested
•178 only in his own affairs. It is the general feeling that group cohesion is breaking up, and new ideas of individual initiative are evident in the practices of the guildsmen.

### D. The Probable Future of the Peking Guilds

There is no indication from the facts gathered from our study that there is any great change taking place in the professional guilds. Inasmuch as these workers are not related to factories or commerce and as there is no large financial investment required in their activities, it is quite probable that they will continue to operate very much as they have heretofore. They may be reorganized into trade unions or some new form of professional association, but the activities of the groups will be little changed, as very distinct differentiation between employer and employee is not essential in most of the professions of the type we have been studying.

It seems probable that eventually the craft guilds in their present form will entirely disappear or be reorganized into labor unions. It is possible that there may be amalgamation of certain groups, such as those engaged in the building trades, into industrial unions. It is at least possible that such a union might maintain the form of a guild where contractors and workers together determine the common policy, along the lines of the Builders Guild in England.

Guilds whose products come into competition with Chinese factory-made articles are likely to disappear entirely. Guilds whose products are sold in large quantities to the foreign market are unlikely to continue because of the new relationships with the foreign trader.

The great majority of the craft guilds will probably be reorganized into labor unions, while the employer class related to such guilds will form employers associations.

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Among the commercial groups it seems probable that the same differentation will take place: the managers of each trade will have their own associations with representation in the Chamber of Commerce and the workers will form their own trade unions.[1]

[1] It is assumed that the organization of new guilds in Peking such as the electricians, the bicycle and the automobile guilds is merely an indication of conformity on the part of these tradesmen to common commercial organization and that the tendencies toward guild disruption will eventually affect these groups also.

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## B. The Probable Effects of the New Economic and Commercial Trends on the Values of the Guild System

Because of the extreme complexity of the political, economic and social changes now taking place in China, we cannot hope to arrive at any definite answer to the question under discussion. We can, however, point out (1) what is happening to these "values" in places where modern industry and commerce are most highly developed, (2) the forces that are apparently operating in such a way as to destroy not only the guild structure but also the values inherent in them, and (3) those movements and tendencies that may serve as means for conserving certain of these values.

### (1) Social Results Following the Breaking Up of the Guilds and the Coming of Modern Industry

Child labor, unsanitary conditions, long hours and low pay are common both to the old guild system and to the modern factories.[1] In any given industry wages are probably slightly higher in the factories than they were in the guilds.[2] Factory production in many cases brings a large number of industrial accidents,[3] an increase in tuberculosis,[4] the introduc-

[1] P. Henry, *Some Aspects of the Labor Problem in China* (Geneva, 1927), pp. 14-15.

[2] Henry, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-18 and Lewis S. Gannett, *Young China* (New York, 1926) section v, "China: the World's Proletariat," pp. 18-22.

[3] "In November 1925 a little girl of 13 was found towards 2 o'clock in the morning with her head crushed under a spinning machine in the Shanghai Cotton Mill. According to the foreman's report she had fallen asleep near the machine and had been scalped by a driving belt. Similar accidents had been reported in the Shanghai press a few months earlier —children having their lips and teeth torn away, little girls scalped, etc. Only one attempt has been made to compile accident statistics; the tables show that one-third of the children treated at the Industrial Hospital of Shanghai were totally disabled (the proportion in the case of women was

(For conclusion of this note (3) and note 4 see next page.)

4: Burgess E-4.5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12



tion of woman labor in the factory (formerly they manufactured only in the homes), night work for women and children,[1] the concentration of large numbers of workers in the large cities, with the attendant overcrowding and general bad housing conditions.[2] Labor has been recruited in many cases by labor contractors who have profited by the low wages.[3] The large number of workers in the factory unit, added to the contract system, has destroyed the former close personal relation between master and men. These and many other changes in the life of the laborers, unmitigated by enforceable labor legislation,[4] have brought discontent and class hatred, with strikes that frequently result in bloodshed.[5]

The passivity of the workers is disappearing and a class-conscious labor movement is developing. In the tending of the machine the sense of creative accomplishment has gone.

44 per cent); two-thirds of these children were victims of machinery accidents, the majority having received head or hand injuries. It was the night shifts which suffered most, as indeed happens wherever work is carried on continuously."—Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[4] Adelaide M. Anderson, *Humanity and Labour in China* (London, 1926), chap. vii, "Things Industrial Seen in China," pp. 163-202.

[1] Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[3] *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

[5] Ta Chen, *Analysis of Strikes in China from 1918 to 1926* (Shanghai, 1926) and *The Labor Movement in China*, pp. 19-20. Henry, *op. cit.*, pp. 20-21: "It is accordingly in modern factories, in spite of the immense superiority of their workshops as regards equipment, that the elements of revolt among the workers are fomented. Strikes and mutinies, the latter going so far as the assassination of foremen, increase year by year. The origin of these movements does not lie solely in the propaganda of a few leaders; they are also undoubtedly the outcome of too sudden a disturbance of the old equilibrium, of a certain social disorganization common to transition periods such as China is passing through under the influence of modern ideas, and even of the moral anarchy provoked in certain cases by the sudden abandonment of the family system."

4: Burgess E-4.5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12



Class solidarity is replacing guild solidarity among both managers and workers. Between factories competition is taking the place of the cooperation practiced within the guilds. The organization of employers' associations and trade unions [1] among the commercial groups and the increase in the size of the trading houses and stores has tended to accentuate class interest and destroy the former sense of trade solidarity.

### (2) CONDITIONS UNFAVORABLE TO THE CONSERVATION OF THE OLD VALUES IN THE NEW ECONOMIC LIFE

The rapidity of the spread of the capitalistically controlled factory system in its present form, accompanied until very recently by passive acceptance by the masses and an eager welcome by the intellectuals [2] and business men, and a general disregard on the part of both government and public of the social results of the industrial and commercial revolution, would seem to point in the direction of a complete destruction not only of the old organizations but also of the relation-

[1] *Cf.* pp. 225-227.

[2] Mr. V. K. Ting, head of the Chinese Geological Survey, formerly mayor of Shanghai, in dealing with the recent changes in China, said: "Industrialisation based on modern science enables us to develop and utilize our natural resources on a large scale. . . . Even to a casual observer the phenomenal growth of the cotton mills must attract his attention . . . silk filatures have a similar story. . . . They represent only one phase of the general tendency of industrialization. . . . The development of the coal mining industry deserves special mention. Unlike the cotton and silk factories it has nothing to do with Treaty Ports. In 1911 there was not a single mine financed with Chinese capital and operated by Chinese engineers. . . . At present there are more than a dozen prosperous companies owned and operated by Chinese with an aggregate capital of 60 million dollars and a capacity of producing 8 million tons per annum out of the 14 million tons produced by all the modern mines in China. . . . Every new mine organized by the Chinese means a fresh training ground for mining students and every little lighting plant requires at least a skilled electrician. The result is that a nucleus of professional men has been created who will form the backbone of the future Chinese Republic." —Quoted in Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-113.

4: Burgess E-4, 5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12



178 ship and values associated with them, and to a gradual building up of a Western-style competitive industrial and commercial system.

The present lack of stability in the government of China gives little hope either of enforceable legislation to mitigate the harmful results of this rapid economic transformation or of control of industry and commerce. The continuance of the system of special exemption from taxation [1] of foreign merchants and manufacturers doing business in China, of foreign customs control and of foreign concessions, makes it still more difficult for the government to have any control of the course of the economic revolution.

As P. Henry has put it, the "crux of the whole matter" is the surplus of labor in the large cities. With several potential applicants for every job, no change for the better in the conditions of labor and no favorable reorganization of the structure of industry seem probable.[2]

### (3) MOVEMENTS AND TENDENCIES THAT MAY SERVE AS A MEANS FOR CONSERVING CERTAIN VALUES OF OLD GUILD LIFE

178 185 The independent efforts of socially-minded Chinese and foreign manufacturers to improve the conditions [3] of labor and the voluntary acceptance by many of them of the purely advisory standards regarding conditions and hours of labor promulgated by the Peking Government in 1923,[4] would indicate a hopeful interest on the part of many employers.

The intellectual and political leaders associated with the present nationalist movement have very definitely espoused

[1] Raymond T. Rich, *Extraterritoriality and Tariff Autonomy in China* (Shanghai, 1925), pp. 46-7.

[2] Henry, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

4: Burgess E-4, 5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12



the cause of labor.[1] They are discontented with the present conditions of industry and many of them are opposed to the present form of industrial organization and control. What form of labor legislation or what methods of industrial regulation and control they may eventually adopt depends largely on which of the various factions within the Peoples Party eventually controls that political group. But that continued efforts to mitigate the harmful social effects of the present economic revolution will be put forth, seems probable.

The Protestant Churches of China, as represented by the National Christian Council in Shanghai, in recent years have championed with considerable effect the reform in the con-

[1] The following principles of the Nationalist Party related to matters of labor were worked out and adopted at a national conference of the *Kuo Min Tang* at Canton, August, 1926:

1. To enact labor legislation.
2. To enact an eight-hour day, and to prohibit work for longer than ten hours daily.
3. To work for a minimum wage.
4. To prohibit the use of child labor, the age limit being fourteen years.
5. To modify the existing apprenticeship system.
6. To provide for payment for sixty days for women workers at the time of childbirth.
7. To improve sanitation in industrial plants and to avert industrial accidents.
8. To provide for freedom of association, speech and press for all workers.
9. To advocate manhood suffrage.
10. To promote workers' education.
11. To promote cooperative societies.
12. To control conditions of "contract work," or farming out of work to home workers.
13. To recognize the legal status of trade unions.
14. To assist effective organizations of workers.
15. To obtain payment for workers for rest days and holidays.

*Cf.* also, Yang, Kwang Sheng, "The Growth of Nationalism," *Current History*, vol. xxvi, no. 3, pp. 250-263.

4. Burgess E-4, 5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12



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ditions of women and children in industry.[1] They recommended to the International Missionary Council held at Jerusalem, March 24–April 8, 1928, that action be taken against certain features of the Western economic exploitation of peoples in China and elsewhere where early forms of industrial organization still largely prevail.[2] This recommendation met with favorable action on the part of the conference.

The advocates, both Chinese and Russian, of a system of industry and commerce modeled after that of Soviet Russia have since 1925 had considerable influence on an important faction in the Peoples Party. Although for the present this group has little power in China, there is no possible prediction as to its influence in the future.[3]

[1] Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 15, 91, 111, 124.

[2] *Findings of the National Conference of Christianizing Economic Relations*, Shanghai, Aug. 18-28, 1927, pp. 10-11.

"2. That there is need for more missionary work in the training of Christian industrial leaders for the purpose of bringing about favorable working conditions in all industries and promoting better relationship between employers and employees.

"3. That missionaries, and Christian people they represent, should exert their influence individually and collectively upon international trade, in order that trade which is harmful to the people of the buying countries may be restricted or abolished, while it is recognized that trade in useful commodities should be developed to the benefit of all concerned.

"4. That the missionary movement should use its influence to see that any foreign investments of capital in borrowing countries be made only on equitable terms of mutual benefit without any motive or possibility of political aggression.

"5. That when foreign industrial enterprises are established in countries where industrial conditions are less satisfactory, foreign employers should be encouraged to set a standard consistent with the best practices in their own countries and to use their influence towards the general applications of such standard.

"6. That the Christian Church should keep itself ready to cooperate with the labor movements which have for their chief object the improvement of the working conditions and the uplifting of the laborers."

[3] Monroe, *China: A Nation in Evolution*, pp. 209-233; Millard, T. F., *China—Where It Is Today and Why*, pp. 181-187; Nearing, Scott,

4: Burgess E-4,5 (1926-1927) 1928 AF12 North China AF12



It would, of course, be incorrect to characterize Russian influence and propaganda in China as definitely directed toward the conservation of the values of old Chinese industrial and commercial life. Soviet influence is, rather, simply another type of cultural interpenetration inducing China to adopt a particular Western economic and political system. Our justification for including the influences of Soviet Russia among the forces here listed is that this influence is directed against the exploitation of labor and that certain features of the Soviet system emphasize the importance of local group cooperation and deprecate unrestricted competition. These last-mentioned features have their counterpart in the old guild system.

Of importance to all groups seeking in any way to modify the existing conditions, processes and organization of industry and commerce along lines better adapted to ancient habits of thought and forms of social organization, is a thorough knowledge of the cultural and social background of China. The growing interest in social research in China is a factor in our problem.[1]

*Whither China* (New York, 1928), pp. 62-92; Gannett, Lewis S., *Young China* (New York, 1926), pp. 32-36; Chen, Ta, *The Labor Movement in China*, pp. 22-23.

[1] Franklin C. H. Lee, "The Social Survey Movement in China" (in Chinese), *Sociological World* (Peking), June, 1927, pp. 79-100.

The Chinese Mass Education Movement with its national organization in Peking and its program to eliminate illiteracy in China maintains a special research bureau of trained investigators who have been engaged particularly in rural research. In 1925 the China Foundation in Peking (supported by the interest on the second American Boxer Indemnity Refund) organized its Bureau of Social and Economic Research under the able leadership of Dr. L. K. Tao, formerly of the National Government University, Peking. Important investigations of rural industrial life and of the standard of living in North China are being conducted by this Bureau. The Institute of Pacific Relations which last met in Honolulu, July, 1927, has under way important research projects in China. The National Government University, Yenching University of

100 was steadily maintained. 797

About 1925 a new pastor replaced the old one who had been so succesful in gaining the confidence of the townspeople. The new man was not so successful and at same time Presbyterian Churches adopted a policy of self-help for their rural churches. The people as a whole are very poor, and were not sufficiently interested to give the necessary help, so the church gradually closed down its services and school.

### 4. Chinese Temples

There are altogether ten temples in the town, five 795
in the northern section, and five in the southern. All of the them are inactive, and there is only one monk who lives in a small room, and watches one of the temples. The large number of temples, and their rich ornament, now decaying, give us an idea of their power and prestige in the past history of China.

At present the two largest temples are being 346
utilised by the school and the self-government associa- 178
tion. In most cases in China it will be found that the temples are the only public buildings which are available to serve the needs of the institutions necessary for the life of the town, and everywhere one finds old temples which in the past had tremendous power in the lives of the people, being used to house schools and public offices. Then we see the decay of 779
the temples and the lack of interest on the part of the 178
people it seems as if Buddhism is tottering, and that left to itself it will gradually die as a power in the peoples' lives, but the drastic measures taken by the

6:Young et. al. E-5 (1928-1929) 1930 AF12 North China AF12



779 178 government and the Party organisations to destroy idols and superstitution, has had its reaction, and in many places more interest is again being taken in the Buddhist teachings by uneducated people.

7: Gamble S-5 (1926-1927) 1933 AF12 North China AF12



out of the city by Chang Tso-lin. However, the city was at peace during the entire time of the study; and while many foreigners, fearing a possible Communist uprising, hurriedly left during the spring of 1927, the ordinary Chinese family was not seriously affected by the tension of those days. Furthermore, a previous study showed that prices in Peiping were little influenced by political events unless communications were interrupted, and that they quickly returned to normal as soon as the roads were opened.[3] The price level had been rising, until in 1927 the prices of pork and mutton were 57 and 87 per cent higher than the 1924 averages, and the 1924-1927 increase for salt was 66 per cent, oils 35 per cent, coalballs 38 per cent, flours between 15 and 20 per cent, but, during the time the field-work of this study was being carried on, prices remained relatively stable. The combined index number for food, clothing and fuel ranged from 97.8 to 102.5 with the high point in December and the low point in October.[4]

One special reason for making the study in 1926 was that it was evident a change of some sort was coming in China, both in the political and the economic fields. Trade-unions were being organized in many cities and were increasing wages, prices had been going up, and there were many groups opposed to the Peiching (Peking) government. A study of family budgets made at that time would anticipate the coming change, would give a picture of conditions in a large non-industrial city before the change should take place, and would provide a point of departure for measuring the changes and development of the new régime. Less than a year after the field-work

[3] No. 18, Bibliography. [4] Nos. 11 and 18.

7: Gamble S-5 (1926-1927) 1933 AF12 North China AF12



121 was completed, the Nationalist forces captured Peking, 178 changed its name to Peiping, and moved the capital to Nanking.

## Definition of Terms

162 *Age* refers to age figured according to the Chinese system. An infant is considered to be one year old when born and two years old on the next New Year's day. The usual method of figuring the equivalent age according to the Western system is to deduct one year from the Chinese age. As the Chinese ages have been used, the limits of the five-year age groups have been set as 1 to 5, 6 to 10, rather than, under 5, 5 to 9, et cetera, the usual limits when ages are figured to the latest birthday.

434 *Budget* refers to actual income and expenditure rather than to 511 any plan of family finance. Family budget and family account are used synonymously.

*Business Expense* refers to items spent in connection with the business by which the family earns its living, such as ricksha rent, ricksha taxes, push-cart rent, business supplies, wages of workers doing other than domestic work. If entered in the family accounts, these items have been omitted from the expense side and have been deducted from the reported current income.

*Capital Expenditure* is money spent for a capital item, loaned to others, used to reduce accounts payable, invested with a savings society, deposited in a store or bank. If paid out of capital income, it has been omitted from the account, as it would then represent a reinvestment of capital funds rather than the expenditure of part of the family's current account.

*Capital Income* is money received from capital sources, the sale of property, borrowing, the reduction of accounts receivable, savings. Even though it represents money received, capital income has been omitted from the account unless it was used to meet current expenses.

804 A *Catty* is a Chinese unit of weight. It varies somewhat, depending upon the particular kind of catty used, but ordinarily it is taken as equivalent to 1.33 pounds.